Many a person has been adversely effected by an entity
called the 'Sheriff of Victoria' under the legal name of Brendan Facey.
One must not rely on the Rupert Murdoch media empire to
inform the masses that this is done so unlawfully, under fraudulent action, deception, coercion and
extortion with threats of violence and incarceration.
This is also endorsed/supported/perpetuated by a business
called CCV (Civic Compliance Victoria), ABN 68 122 448 122, and Victoria Police
ABN 63 446 481 493.
Their (CCV's) standard response to your legal obligation (ask questions, as people in court do) is
"Just pay up".
Many people's first correspondence from the (alleged) '
Sheriff of Victoria may come in the form of a notice, as a result of not paying
a fine from the unlawful and illegal 'Infringements Court'.
Many people have mistaken this document as an actual
'outstanding' warrant to the amount claimed in the paperwork.
The Sheriff's Office of Victoria has sent out paperwork to
people claiming outstanding warrants containing a logo of the Supreme Court of
Victoria.
This suggests that the Sheriff's Office comes under the banner of the Supreme Court of Victoria.
What people MUST know is that the Sheriff of Victoria is supposed to be an officer of the Supreme Court of Victoria, and MUST be appointed as such in accordance with the law.
The position must be gazetted, and the appointment of the person must be in the lawful government gazette.
There is no gazetted appointment for the person Brendan Facey as the Sheriff of Victoria, as required by law.
The Sheriff's Office of Victoria has also sent out paperwork
to people claiming outstanding warrants containing the logo of the Magistrates'
Court of Victoria.
So when did the jurisdiction change and where/when was this gazetted?
When asked of the Sheriff's Office to produce the alleged
outstanding warrant the response obtained was that none exist.
That's right non ever existed.
So let's make this clear one more time.
There are no lawful warrants emanating from a place of
business called the Sheriff's Office ABN 32 790 228 959.
So what's a 'warrant' supposed to look like?
Well according to their own laws, and not any 'conspiracy
theories', forms directions etc must be documented and filled out according the
rules specified.
This is what a 'warrant' is supposed to look like sans red
comments:
See form in attached link -
So where's the fraud in the letter from Brendan Facey as the
Sheriff of Victoria.
So in this first letter from a person called Brendan
Facey as the Sheriff of Victoria from
the Sheriff's Office Victoria the claim comes to the unsuspecting customer.
In this document you may notice a "Yours
sincerely", signature, a name and a
title of Office.
Seems pretty legitimate right?
Take another look.
The signature is a digitised (electronic) signature that is stored on a
computer and pasted into the document.
There is no 'lawful' wet ink signature from that person.
The document is a fraud.
If anyone has obtained a 'wet ink' signature from the person Brendan Facey as the Sheriff of Victoria, please post this in the comments section.
Please do not post Brendan Facey's signature and position as Director of Infringement Management and Enforcement Services, as this is not what we require and has already been covered in the Corporate Australia blog post of the title:
Exposing Corporate Criminals - Victoria's sheriff - Brendan Facey in the link:
See the following document of the with regards to the
lawfulness of an electronic signature, citing case law of the title
Court rules
that uploaded electronic signature did not download a loan guarantee
The
convenience of executing legal documentation with electronic signatures must be
carefully weighed against issues of enforceability and security. In this
update, we explain the decision in Williams
Group Australia Pty Ltd v Crocker [2015] NSWSC 1907, in which the Supreme Court of
New South Wales ruled that a company director was not bound by a guarantee that
(apparently) bore his electronic signature.
Key
messages
The key
messages from this case are:
- An executor – being the
person who physically or electronically applies a signature – is not
implicitly authorised to use another person’s electronic signature if it
was applied without that person’s knowledge or consent. This is similar to
the situation where an executor forges another person’s handwritten
signature.
- In this case, a director was
not liable in circumstances where his failure to change a default password
enabled another person to access and supposedly apply his electronic
signature. However, it is possible that a person could demonstrate an
intention to authorise another to apply their electronic signature if they
took active steps to permit access to the means of applying that
electronic signature (by, for example, circulating their password).
- Accordingly, where a
contract is to be executed by an individual using an electronic signature,
the accepting party can mitigate risk by considering whether additional
steps should be taken to verify that the individual consented to their
signature being applied. For example, in addition to having the execution
witnessed, the individual could be required to confirm their execution by
email.
- Courts will be unwilling to
find that an unauthorised execution was ratified unless there is clear
evidence that the person purportedly bound saw the document, appreciated
its salient features, and then failed to take any remedial action. In this
case, the court was sympathetic to the view that a person should not have
to read each and every email and attachment in their inbox.
Background
Williams
Group Australia Pty Ltd (Lender) sold building materials to IDH Modular
Pty Ltd (Borrower) under the terms of a trading credit agreement that
incorporated a director’s guarantee and indemnity. The document was seemingly
executed by the Borrower’s three directors, including Mr Crocker (Guarantor),
and witnessed by one of the Borrower’s employees.
In the
months before execution, one of the Borrower’s directors (Brooks) set up
a HelloFax electronic signature account that enabled the directors to remotely
upload and apply their signatures to documents. Each time a director’s
signature was applied, that director would receive a confirmation email
attaching the executed document. The Guarantor, who worked interstate, received
his login details for the account directly from Brooks and never changed his
password. He soon uploaded his signature to the account.
When the
Lender attempted to enforce the guarantee in the amount of nearly $890,000, the
Guarantor claimed he had not executed nor authorised the guarantee’s execution
on his behalf, nor had he any knowledge that he had been signed up to such a
substantial liability. At trial, the parties accepted that the Guarantor had
not executed the document himself – rather, an unidentified third person using
his account had uploaded and applied their own signature purporting to be the
Guarantor’s.
The
Lender, whom at the time had no knowledge of these circumstances, argued that
the guarantee should be enforced on two bases:
- By failing to change his
default password, the Guarantor had impliedly authorised Brooks or any
other person who received the login details from Brooks to execute the
document on the Guarantor’s behalf (actual authorisation).
Alternatively, even if there was not actual authorisation, the Guarantor
had represented such authority to the Lender (ostensible authorisation).
- Even if the Guarantor did
not actually authorise or represent authorisation, a number of
circumstances (principally being sent a confirmation email) indicated that
he had ratified the execution.
Decision
McCallum
J of the Supreme Court of New South Wales J ruled in the Guarantor’s favour. We
summarise the judgment’s key points below.
Authority
McCallum
J acknowledged that an implied agency relationship could arise if the Guarantor
placed another person in the situation where, by ‘the ordinary uses of
mankind’, it could be understood that the person signing represented and acted
for the Guarantor. However, the Guarantor’s mere omission to change his
password did not demonstrate an intention to authorise anyone else to operate
the account on his behalf. Such use would be a misuse – not an ‘ordinary use’
capable of amounting to implied authorisation. This conclusion was further
bolstered by the fact that the Guarantor was never actually advised by the
Lender, Borrower or other directors that he was required to provide a guarantee
under the borrowing arrangement (even when the Borrower had previously provided
a similar guarantee to the Lender).
The
representation of authority came from a combination of features of [the bank officer’s]
presentation to the outside world, all attributable to the fact that Pacific
was dealing with a bank, with all its institutional trappings.
Not only
was the Lender here dealing with an individual lacking the ‘institutional
trappings’ of a large company, the Guarantor had made no representations that
another person was authorised or ‘held out’ as being able to bind him to the
guarantee because, in the Lender’s mind, the Guarantor himself had signed it.
Ratification
Instead,
the critical factor was whether the Guarantor had notice that he had been
personally committed to the guarantee. The Lender’s principal submission was
that the Guarantor received a confirmation email attaching the document after
it was executed. However, Justice McCallum considered that this was a ‘slender
basis’ to prove ratification because:
- While it was accepted that
the confirmation email was sent to the Guarantor’s email address, the
Lender failed to prove that the Guarantor had received and read the email,
opened the attached document, and made himself aware of its salient
features.
- It was not clear on its face
that the attached document contained a guarantee because it was labelled
‘credit application’.
The
Lender was ordered to pay the Guarantor’s costs.
You can download the full 36 page document contained in the link:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B21_coIgIYu2WXNOdkZMV2ZyeDQ/view?usp=sharing
