Census fine about as ‘lawful’ as a Covid fine?

Australia’s authorities are corrupt to the core.

During a normal business day they practice deception, coercion, intimidation, fear of incarceration, but most importantly pressure you, the serfs into submission, or rather ‘consent’.

Australia’s governments, federal state/territorial are also human rights abusers, where they truly do not care unless it becomes public knowledge headed for the courts, but that topic is for another day.

So, during ‘Covid’, across Australia the authorities had no lawfully (as opposed to ‘legally') enacted ‘instrument’ to issue a covid related fine, but they still did anyway, preying on the ignorance of the general population.

Heavily monitoring social media during this time, once the authorities figured out that people were aware how to successfully challenge the lawfulness (under Section 78B, of the Judiciary Act 1903), they started to drop or withdraw the person’s fine.

SO, now as similarly with the Covid situation, the mainstream media is reporting that failure to comply with the Census will result in a 'huge'* fine.

First and foremost, as with ANY 'fine' or rather allegation of wrongdoing/criminal activity, the burden of proof is on the accuser, period.

You, the plebs/serfs/general population are told that if you lie or skip the census, you ‘could’ face a fine of up to $3640 AND $364 per day it goes incomplete.

(Show us the 'lawfully' enacted instrument for the fine, as opposed to a legal statute).

Therefore such a ‘*cruel and unusual punishment’ MUST be challenged in the appropriate court under a ‘question of law’, that being a Section 78B, where the burden of proof is on this business called the Australian Bureau of Statistics.

An important aspect is also to consider, is that did your ‘person’ get lawfully notified?

Merely stating the the ABS is enacted under the Australian Bureau of Statistics Act 1975 is zero proof of its lawfulness.

Subpoena the head of power for that Act, or even write an FOI to the government for this, and put your response on social media.

If it is stated that your ‘person’ is lying, how is this information obtained?

It must be proven that you 'lied', where just merely one ‘cannot remember’ like (Victorian premier Daniel) Andrews stated on the public record, is sufficient as in the Andrews example.

There are a few other intricacies that need to be dealt with, where is it advisable to obtain the ‘correct’ legal information prior to the matter being brought before the courts.

From the information that has been obtained, the federal government is not acting ‘lawfully’ for not only carrying out the census, but also implementing fines on those who do not participate.

What is certain also, that this is another con job by the government.

Keep in mid that they SOLD 'your' data in a previous census.

Can a department 'lawfully' sell your data for profit, and if so, where is this stated in a 'lawfully' enacted instrument?

In their 'spam' letter, to you, the ABS or rather Jenny Telford states that "The Census is compulsory*", where the asterisk points to a privacy website link, which the nothing to do with proving that it is "compulsory".

A typical gaslighting tactic by the governments of Australia.

Warning! Revolut wins Australian banking licence. Don't use it as it's not safe nor secure!

Just because a corporation is allowed to trade in Australia does not mean that it's good for the people.

It may be good for 'business' but not necessarily for the 'consumer' or corporate fodder.

Revolut is apparently Europe's largest private financial technology company started by Nik Storonsky and Vladimir Yatsenko.

Nik Storonsky is the chief executive of Revolut

From industry sources, it runs on Android 9 with no security patches since 2018, where this no way any sane person should do banking with their app.

Prior to conducting any banking on a mobile platform the system must be up to date with security patches in order to mitigate any threats or exploits.

For a few years, GrapheneOS has been the most secure Android mobile phone operating system, period.

So much so that the Israeli based Cellebrite phone hacking tool cannot penetrate an up to date GrapheneOS based phone in the BFU (Before First Unlock) state.

Revolut previously did run on GrapheneOS but has recently stopped its app from being run, citing security reasons, yet they allow it to run on a mobile phone operating system, where security updates stopped in 2018, or 8 years ago.

It's quite clear that this corporation does not have the best security practices in play, where they should not be trusted with you data or cash, irrespective of their previous financial performance.

Revolut is based in Lithuania, so when/if things go awry, then good luck getting your money out from within their app.

Buyer beware!

Edit:

See complaint from a user:

Good morning,

I am writing to raise a formal complaint regarding Revolut's apparent ongoing rollout of changes to its Android application which prevent, or will prevent, the app from operating on devices running GrapheneOS.

My understanding is that this change is currently being rolled out to only a proportion of users. It has not affected my account yet, but reports from other users indicate that Revolut is testing or progressively deploying this restriction. I am therefore raising this complaint now, before I am potentially locked out of access to my bank account.

I object to this decision in the strongest possible terms for several reasons.

1. GrapheneOS is not an insecure or compromised operating system

The restriction does not appear simply to be identifying genuinely insecure devices. GrapheneOS has specifically reported Revolut detecting and rejecting GrapheneOS devices.

This distinction matters.

GrapheneOS is a security- and privacy-focused Android operating system designed specifically for supported Google Pixel devices. It retains verified boot and supports a locked bootloader, while adding substantial security hardening beyond standard Android.

Blocking such a device merely because it does not run Google's stock operating system is not a meaningful assessment of whether that device is secure.

To use a simple analogy, it is rather like an insurance company refusing to insure a house because the customer's front-door lock is too secure.

If Revolut genuinely requires device integrity verification, GrapheneOS provides mechanisms by which applications can perform hardware-backed attestation and verify legitimate GrapheneOS installations. A blanket refusal to support the operating system is therefore neither the only nor, in my view, the most sensible security option available.

2. The policy produces an absurd security contradiction

Revolut currently supports Android versions going back many years.

This means that the Revolut application may operate on an old Android phone which is no longer receiving current operating-system security patches, while refusing to operate on a modern Google Pixel running an actively maintained, security-hardened version of Android.

It is very difficult to reconcile those two positions with an assertion that this restriction is necessary for customer security.

A modern Pixel running an up-to-date GrapheneOS installation with verified boot and a locked bootloader is clearly not inherently less secure simply because the operating system is not Google's stock Pixel firmware.

Security decisions should be based upon the actual security properties and integrity of a device, rather than an arbitrary list of approved operating-system vendors.

3. Revolut has apparently provided no viable alternative means of accessing my money

I have already contacted Revolut customer support regarding this issue.

I was advised that, should my device become unsupported, I could either use Revolut's web application or use another mobile phone.

Neither suggestion provides a reasonable solution.

Firstly, the web application itself requires authentication using the Revolut mobile application. If Revolut deliberately prevents that application from running on my device, telling me to use a website which requires approval from the application I can no longer use is circular and plainly does not solve the problem.

Secondly, I was effectively advised that I could obtain or borrow another person's phone, install Revolut on it, and log into my bank account there.

I find it extraordinary that this can seriously be proposed as the more secure alternative.

Revolut would apparently prefer me to enter my banking credentials and establish access to my account on a friend's device — a device over which I have no long-term control and whose security I cannot independently establish — rather than allow me to use my own modern Pixel with a locked bootloader and a security-focused operating system.

That appears directly contrary to the stated security objective of this change.

4. This risks depriving an existing customer of practical access to their bank account

This is not merely a question of whether Revolut chooses to support an optional feature on a particular platform.

I am an existing customer. I receive my salary into Revolut, use it as a significant part of my everyday banking arrangements, and pay for a Metal subscription.

Revolut has encouraged customers to treat its service as their bank. It is therefore entirely reasonable for customers to expect that Revolut will not deliberately remove their primary means of accessing their accounts without providing a genuinely functional alternative.

If Revolut introduces a technical restriction which it knows will prevent an existing customer from using the application, while its alternative web interface itself depends upon that application for authentication, that raises a much more serious question of effective access to the customer's financial services.

I should not be forced to purchase and carry a second mobile telephone solely because Revolut has chosen to reject a secure operating system which my existing hardware is perfectly capable of running.

Resolution requested

I would therefore like Revolut to:

confirm whether it intends to block, directly or indirectly, correctly installed GrapheneOS devices from accessing the Revolut application;

reconsider this policy and implement an appropriate method of supporting GrapheneOS, including hardware-backed device attestation where Revolut considers integrity verification necessary;

confirm that existing customers will not be deprived of access to their accounts solely because they use GrapheneOS on an otherwise supported device with a locked bootloader; and

if Revolut nevertheless intends to impose this restriction, provide a fully functional method of accessing and administering a Revolut account which does not itself require authorisation from the mobile application that Revolut has chosen to block.

I would also appreciate an explanation of the security rationale for permitting the application to operate on older Android devices which may no longer receive security updates while rejecting a current, supported Pixel running a hardened Android operating system.

Please treat this correspondence as a formal complaint, rather than general product feedback, and provide me with Revolut's formal written response.

If Revolut proceeds with this restriction without providing a reasonable means for affected customers to continue accessing their accounts, or if I do not receive a satisfactory response to this complaint, I intend to refer the matter to the Bank of Lithuania, as the competent out-of-court dispute resolution authority identified in Revolut Bank UAB's terms for Maltese customers. I will also consider seeking assistance through the Maltese Office of the Arbiter for Financial Services and the FIN-NET cross-border consumer complaints framework where appropriate.

I sincerely hope escalation will not be necessary. I have been a loyal Revolut customer for years and have been sufficiently satisfied with the service to entrust Revolut with my salary payments and pay for a Metal subscription. That makes it particularly disappointing to face the prospect of being arbitrarily excluded from my own banking application despite using a modern and demonstrably security-focused device.

I would much prefer Revolut to address the underlying technical issue properly rather than force otherwise satisfied customers to choose between replacing their operating system, purchasing an unnecessary second phone, or moving their banking elsewhere.

I look forward to your formal response.

Kind regards,

See response from Revolut:

     Source:supplied