We've stated before that Australia is an Alcatraz version 2.
None dare call it a conspiracy.
One would only have to look into the new 'laws' that are being introduced.
There is literally no such thing a 'privacy' (for the people) in Australia.
Information is shared about you without your knowledge or consent behind your back from corporation to corporation.
"Yeah, but that's ILLEGAL" exclaims the blue collar worker who heard something about a 'Privacy Act'.
"Well" the learned colleague may say "Have you seen a successful prosecution against the corporation involved?".
What many Australians do not comprehend is that Australia is still a penal colony, something which is reflected in the laws that are being passed.
You can read the article of the 12th of December 2015 from gizmodo.com.au of the headline:
In Australia, Even Learning About Encryption Will Be Illegal Soon
You might not think that an academic computer science course could be
classified as an export of military technology. But under the
Defence Trade Controls Act
— which passed into law in April, and will come into force next year —
there is a real possibility that even seemingly innocuous educational
and research activities could fall foul of Australian defence export
control laws.
Handcuffs picture from Shutterstock
Under these laws, such “supplies of technology” come under a
censorship regime involving criminal penalties of up to ten years
imprisonment. How could this be?
The story begins with the Australian government’s Defence and Strategic Goods List (
DSGL). This list specifies goods considered important to national defence and security, and which are therefore tightly controlled.
Regulation of military weapons is not a particularly controversial
idea. But the DSGL covers much more than munitions. It also includes
many “dual-use” goods, which are goods with both military and civilian
uses. This includes substantial sections on
chemicals,
electronics and
telecommunications, among other things.
Disturbingly, the DSGL risks veering wildly in the direction of
over-classification, covering activities that are completely unrelated
to military or intelligence applications.
To illustrate, I will focus on the university sector and one area of
interest to mathematicians like myself: encryption. But similar
considerations apply to a
wide range of subject material, and commerce, industry and government.
Encryption: an essential tool for privacy
Encryption is the process of encoding a message so that it can be
sent privately. Decryption is the process of decoding it, so that it can
be read. Encryption and decryption are two aspects of
cryptography, the study of secure communication.
As with many technologies subject to dual-use regulation, the first question is whether encryption should be covered at all.
Once the preserve of spies and governments, encryption algorithms
have now become an essential part of modern life. We use them almost
every time we go online.
Encryption is used routinely by consumers to guard against identity
theft, by businesses to ensure the security of transactions, by
hospitals to ensure the privacy of medical records, and many other
organisations. Given that email has about as much security as a
postcard, encryption is the electronic equivalent of an envelope.
Encryption is perhaps dual-use in the narrow sense that it is useful
to both military/intelligence agencies as well as civilians. But so are
other relatively mundane technologies like
cars.
Moreover, since the
Edward Snowden revelations — and even much
earlier for
those who
were paying
attention — essentially everyone knows they are subject to mass surveillance by the US
National Security Agency, along with its
Five Eyes partners, including Australia.
While states have no right to privacy, an individual’s right to privacy is
considered a fundamental
human right.
And in today’s world, encryption is essential for individual citizens
to safeguard this human right. Strict control of encryption as dual-use
technology, then, would not only be a misuse of state power, but would
represent the curtailment of a fundamental right.
How the DSGL covers encryption
Nonetheless, let’s assume for the purposes of argument that there is a
justification for regarding at least some aspects of cryptography as
dual-use, and consider how the DSGL covers encryption.
The DSGL contains detailed technical specifications. Very roughly, it
covers encryption above a certain “strength” level, as measured by
technical parameters such as “key length” or “field size”.
The practical question is how high the bar is set: how powerful must encryption be in order to be classified as dual-use?
The bar is currently set low. For instance,
software engineers debate whether they should use 2048 or 4096 bits for the
RSA algorithm.
But the DSGL classifies anything over 512 bits as dual-use. In reality,
the only cryptography not covered by the DSGL is cryptography
so weak that it would be imprudent to use.
Moreover, the DSGL doesn’t just cover encryption software: it also
covers systems, electronics and equipment used to implement, develop,
produce or test it.
In short, the DSGL casts an extremely wide net, potentially catching
open source privacy software, information security research and
education, and the entire computer security industry in its snare.
Most ridiculous, though, are some badly flawed technicalities. As I have
argued before, the specifications are so imprecise that they potentially include a little algorithm you learned at primary school called
division.
If so, then division has become a potential weapon, and your calculator
(or smartphone, computer, or any electronic device) is a potential
delivery system for it.
These issues are not unique to Australia; the DSGL encryption provisions are copied almost verbatim from an
international arms control agreement. What is unique to Australia is the strict level of regulation.
Criminal offences for research and teaching?
The Australian Defence Trade Controls Act (
DTCA) regulates the DSGL and enacts a censorship regime with severe criminal penalties.
The DTCA prohibits the “supply” of DSGL technology to anyone outside
Australia without a permit. The “supply” need not involve money, and can
consist of merely providing access to technology. It also prohibits
“publishing” DSGL technology, but after recent amendments, this offence
only applies to half the DSGL: munitions, not dual-use technologies.
What is “supply” then? The law does not define the word precisely, but the
Department of Defence
suggests that merely explaining an algorithm could constitute
“intangible supply”. If so, then surely teaching DSGL material, or
collaborating on research about it, would be covered.
University education is a thoroughly international and online affair —
not to mention research — so any such “supply”, on any DSGL topic, is
likely to end up overseas on a regular basis.
Outside of academia, what about programmers working on international projects such as
Tor,
providing free software so citizens can enjoy their privacy rights
online? Or network security professionals working with overseas
counterparts?
Examples of innocuous, or even admirable, activities potentially
criminalised by this law are easily multiplied. Such activities must
seek government approval or face criminal charges -— an outrageous
attack on academic freedom, to say the least.
There are exemptions, which have been expanded under recent amendments. But they are patchy, uncertain and dangerously limited.
For instance, public domain material and “basic scientific research”
are exempted. However, researchers, by definition, create new material
not in the public domain. And according to the Australian Bureau of
Statistics, “basic scientific research” is a narrow term, which
excludes research with practical objectives. Lecturers, admirably,
often include new research in teaching material. In such circumstances none of these exemptions will be of assistance.
Another exemption covers supplies of dual-use technology made
“preparatory to publication”, apparently to protect researchers. But
this exemption will provide little comfort to researchers aiming for
applications or commercialisation, and none at all to educators or
industry. A further exemption is made for oral supplies of DSGL
technology, so if computer science lecturers can teach without writing
(giving a whole new meaning to “off the books”) they might be safe.
There is no explicit exemption for education. None for public interest material. And indeed, the
government
clearly envisions universities seeking permits to teach students DSGL
material — and, by implication, criminal charges if they do not.
On a rather different note, the DTCA specifically enables the Australian and US militaries to share technology.
Thus, an Australian professor emailing an American collaborator or
postgraduate student about a new applied cryptography idea, or
explaining a new variant on a cryptographic algorithm on a blackboard in
a recorded lecture broadcast over the internet — despite having nothing
explicitly to do with military or intelligence applications — may
expose herself to criminal liability. At the same time, munitions flow
freely across the Pacific. Such is Australia’s military export regime.
Brief reprieve
There is nothing wrong in principle with government regulation of
military technology. But the net is cast too broadly in the DSGL,
especially in the case of encryption. The regulatory approach of the
DTCA’s permit regime is effectively one of censorship with criminal
penalties for breaches.
The result is vast overreach. Even if the Department of Defence did
not exercise its censorship powers, the mere possibility is enough for a
chilling effect stifling the free flow of ideas and progress.
The DTCA was passed in 2012, with the criminal offences scheduled to come into effect in May 2015. Thankfully, emergency
amendments that passed into law in April this year have provided one year’s reprieve.
Despite those amendments, the laws remain paranoid. The DSGL vastly
over-classifies technologies as dual-use, including essentially all
sensible uses of encryption. The DTCA potentially criminalises an
enormous range of legitimate research and development activity as a
supply of dual-use technology, dangerously attacking academic freedom —
and freedom in general — in the process.
Daniel Mathews is Lecturer in Mathematics at Monash University.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
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