Corrupt Victorian government’s unlawful cash grab

The colony’s governments, both state and federal are highly corrupt, where this corruption is masked by their brethren in the judiciary.

 

They act with impunity and in many instances, their alleged (debt) collection is unlawful.

Information from a source has been obtained, on the condition of anonymity, that the government of Victoria has embarked on an unlawful, (alleged) debt collection campaign against their unsuspecting victims, that being the ‘public’ in order to recoup the over $6 billion deficit the people in government have created.

Various ‘revenue raising’ businesses, like Victoria police, Fines Victoria, Sheriff’s Office Victoria, State Revenue Office et al are all unlawfully trying to extort funds from the general population.

The people within the judicature are also in on this multi-billion dollar fraud, as they enable it.

The context of the word ‘unlawful’ is the be understood as, that there is no lawfully enacted instrument that allows action against the person named.

This is particularly true when it comes to warrants for Victoria Police or the so called ‘Sheriff’s Office Victoria’.

Will there be a court matter that the general population will be made aware of by the mainstream media’s ‘court reporters’?

Most definitely not, as this goes against the narrative by the ‘faceless men’.

The plebs MUST be kept in the dark, period.

It’s all a “bread and circuses” clown show.

The Plan is to Make the Internet Worse. Forever!

Enshittification*.

Google along with others are changing the internet for the worse for the general population.

“Everything becomes a printer” is the most accurate summary of the last decade: 

subscriptions + anti-repair as the new business model.

You will own nothing, and not be happy?

The world is designed for the benefit of corporations and not the 'consumers'.

* See definition:

https://phys.org/news/2026-01-stages-enshittification-academic-publishing.pdf

Australia to use phone monitoring tool like ICE in the US?

Australians are no longer in a democracy but rather under a socialist state.

In many instances you don't have a 'right' to 'free speech', but rather you have to ask for permission to protest.

Image: U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement

Briefly,

404 Media has obtained material that explains how Tangles and Webloc, two surveillance systems ICE (Immigration & Customs Enforcement) recently purchased, work. 

Webloc can track phones without a warrant and follow their owners home or to their employer.

A social media and phone surveillance system ICE bought access to is designed to monitor a city neighbourhood or block for mobile phones, track the movements of those devices and their owners over time, and follow them from their places of work to home or other locations, according to material that describes how the system works obtained by 404 Media. 

Commercial location data, in this case acquired from hundreds of millions of phones via a company called Penlink, can be queried without a warrant, according to an internal ICE legal analysis shared with 404 Media. 

The purchase comes squarely during ICE’s mass deportation effort and continued crackdown on protected speech, alarming civil liberties experts and raising questions on what exactly ICE will use the surveillance system for. 

This is a very dangerous tool in the hands of an out-of-control agency.

At the end of the day the surveillance on the general population is going to get worse and worse with ZERO oversight.

What's worse, is the people are accepting this.

Royal Commission into ‘antisemitism’ another deliberately misguided farce?

Historically, royal commissions in this colony are a compromised ‘money for mates’ rort of taxpayer funds.

The corruption of the colony's Anglo-Masonic legal system goes above the comprehension of the ‘average Joe’, exactly the way the system wants it to be.

Edward I

The previous royal commission into the banking and financial services institutions was a deliberately useless farce, where approx 10,000 signatories to it never obtained a remedy.

The Wood Royal Commission on paedophilia, totally useless to the victims of paedophiles in positions of power.

Will the (alleged) ‘royal commission into antisemitism’ ask the fundamental question of why is there a perception/sentiment of antisemitism or is it really anti-Zionism?

Protests in Melbourne

The so called commission will not entertain why is Australia importing Islamic fundamentalists that later carry out heinous actions or incite hate or violence, because it's acceptable if it's against Buddhist, Hindus or Christians?

See article from 2014: 

Adelaide-based Sheikh Sharif Hussein free to preach race hate

The so called commission will not entertain the fact that the Sajid Akram was a 'Person of Interest' and should have not been given the right to reside in Australia, where others have been denied entry of exercising their ‘free speech’ right in this colony.

The so called commission will not entertain the fact that Sajid Akram should have not been given a gun licence by the 'authorities'.

Will the commission obtain evidence that in the 1200’s the Jews were plunging the English population into poverty through a practice called usury, that being making loans that are seen as unfairly enriching the lender?

Will the commission obtain evidence that condemning taking advantage of others' misfortunes, was brought in under a law in 1275 called ‘Statute of the Jewry’ by Edward I of England?

Usury is still practised today and will be well into the future.

Will the so called royal commission look into the history why the Jews were kicked out of Egypt or Spain?

Will the so called royal commission look into the actions of modern day Israel against other nations and the correlation against Zionism?

See video: of the title: Rabbi EXPOSES Israel in Bondi Beach Attacks

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7xEiKpYX5_E

Keeping in mind that the matter of antisemitism vs anti-Zionism has already been before the Federal Court of Australia in 2025, under Wertheim v Haddad. Where the following was stated:

Will the so called commission do a deep dive into Zionism?

So, the royal commission will be into 'antisemitism' and not into the 'Bondi Beach Massacre', where the people will be blamed for (alleged) antisemitism, but an inquiry into the Bondi Beach massacre will pin the blame on the authorities at a fair few levels.

See also: 

Bondi massacre, the government to blame

Bondi massacre, the government to blame

Briefly:

Quite simply put, the Bondi Beach shooting on 14th of December 2025 could have been avoided, where the federal government is negligent in its actions, or inaction.

Over the last few decades the Australian government, has been importing all sorts of trash from all over the planet into this colony, meaning other nations low quality, low value humans, under whatever label.

MANY of these humans do not contribute to society in a positive manner, but rather leech from it, or have the only intention to commit crime for a living.

Sajid Akram, pictured above, should have never been let into the colony, nor should he have ever been given a gun licence, where this is the so called ‘failure of government’.

The Australian government, over the years, has had many different policies in place with regards to importing corporate fodder into Australia.

The racists in government implemented the ‘White Australia policy’ from the beginning of federation until the 1970s.

The policy now is to flood Australia with low quality immigrants, turning a blind eye to their criminal history from their place of origin.

What is worse, for the greater good od society,  is that it’s quite clear that the courts ‘support’ these criminals, letting them back out on the streets, as the system requires repeat offenders in order for it to prosper.

There are other aspects to the actions of the father Sajid Akram and son Naveed Akram combo, which are outside the scope of this article.

New anti-smoking drug a ‘Fizzer’?

The sole purpose that corporations exist for is not to create a product or service but rather to generate profit for the owners/stakeholders from this product or service.

In a fair few instances health of the consumers is not on the cards, with food-like products from corporations like McDonald's, Wendy's, Donut King, et al.

A global 'big pharma' giant has recently put together a drug that allegedly stops people from smoking.

So what they need to do now is to spruik their 'wares' to medical practitioners, where kickbacks are given for every prescription handed out the patient 'customer'/consumer.

That's all very nice, BUT the problem is that a confidential industry insider stated that the drug doesn't work, where the company that produced it, knows that.

Sounds familiar?

A few years ago the same corporation put out a drug that was forced or maybe 'enticed' onto the people, where it did not confer immunity therefore it was falsely labelled as a 'vaccine'.

Naturally it would a good idea to seek a professional medial opinion on this drug from a medical practitioner that has no vested interest in the product.

Creating apps like Signal or WhatsApp could be 'hostile activity,' claims UK watchdog

It's the latest blow to encryption in the UK

---

• Encrypted messaging developers may be considered hostile actors in the UK
• An independent review of national security law warns of overreach
• Encryption repeatedly targeted by UK lawmakers

---

Developers of apps that use end-to-end encryption to protect private communications could be considered hostile actors in the UK.

That is the stark warning from Jonathan Hall KC, the government’s Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation and Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, in a new report on national security laws.

In his independent review of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act and the newly implemented National Security Act, Hall KC highlights the incredibly broad scope of powers granted to authorities.

He warns that developers of apps like Signal and WhatsApp could technically fall within the legal definition of "hostile activity" simply because their technology "make[s] it more difficult for UK security and intelligence agencies to monitor communications."

He writes: "It is a reasonable assumption that this would be in the interests of a foreign state even if though the foreign state has never contemplated this potential advantage."

The report also notes that journalists "carrying confidential information" or material "personally embarrassing to the Prime Minister on the eve of important treaty negotiations" could face similar scrutiny.

While it remains to be seen how this report will influence future amendments, it comes at a time of increasing pressure from lawmakers against encryption.

Encryption under siege

While the report’s strong wording may come as a shock, it doesn't exist in a vacuum. Encrypted apps are increasingly in the crosshairs of UK lawmakers, with several pieces of legislation targeting the technology.

Most notably, Apple was served with a technical capability notice under the Investigatory Powers Act (IPA) demanding it weaken the encryption protecting iCloud data. That legal standoff led the tech giant to disable its Advanced Data Protection instead of creating a backdoor.

The Online Safety Act is already well known for its controversial age verification requirements. However, its most contentious provisions have yet to be fully implemented, and experts fear these could undermine encryption even further.

On Monday, Parliament debated the Act following a petition calling for its repeal. Instead of rolling back the law, however, MPs pushed for stricter enforcement. During the discussion, lawmakers specifically called for a review of other encrypted tools, like the best VPNs.

The potential risks of the Act's tougher stance on encryption were only briefly mentioned during the discussion, suggesting a stark disconnect between MPs and security experts.

Olivier Crépin-Leblond, of the Internet Society, told TechRadar he was disappointed by the outcome of the debate. "When it came to Client Side Scanning (CSS), most felt this could be one of the 'easy technological fixes' that could help law enforcement greatly, especially when they showed their frustration at Facebook rolling end-to-end encryption," he said.

"It's clearly not understood that any such software could fall prey to hackers."

It is clear that for many lawmakers, encryption is viewed primarily as an obstacle to law enforcement. This stands in sharp contrast to the view of digital rights experts, who stress that the technology is vital for protecting privacy and security in an online landscape where cyberattacks are rising.

"The government signposts end-to-end encryption as a threat, but what they fail to consider is that breaking it would be a threat to our national security too," Jemimah Steinfeld, CEO of Index on Censorship, told TechRadar.

She also added that this ignores encryption's vital role for dissidents, journalists, and domestic abuse victims, "not to mention the general population who should be afforded basic privacy."

With the battle lines drawn, we can expect a challenging year ahead for services like Signal and WhatsApp. Both companies have previously pledged to leave the UK market rather than compromise their users' privacy and security.

Source:techradar

The actions of a global 'Nanny State' agenda, nothing to do with 'child safety'.

Bondi Massacre: The question no one is asking?

Briefly,

Australia’s mainstream media playbook is controlled by a few people, where all the stories follow the same line.

See: 

Who REALLY Writes Australia's News? (The truth About AAP)

There’s only a few that dare to venture outside of the ‘approved’ narrative.

The narrative now, after this (deliberate?) 'failure of government', is all about more stringent gun controls, and anti-Semitism and now anti-Zionism or anti an ideology like Communism.

After the Port Arthur incident, stringent gun control came to Australia, but it didn’t curb gun crime. 

The ‘real’ criminals still had guns.

Australia’s authorities are inherently corrupt, where their corrupt actions have devastating effects on the general population.

One action of the corrupt government is that it knowingly import terrorists, for example the ones that (allegedly) committed the mass shooting in Bondi  on the 14th of December 2025.

That’s one example on the extreme side.

Another example is that the federal government deliberately imports low quality humans from all over the world as (alleged) ‘refugees’ that once they are here, they commit criminal actions against the good population of Australia, where the machete attacks in Victoria are a prime example.

This ‘problem’ is not going away anytime soon, where in fact it’s  going to get worse, for the people, and 'better' for the legal system, as they’ll have plenty of new ‘customers’ as that’s what it’s all about.

So, why is Australia importing terrorists?

Australia’s corrupt Anglo-Masonic legal system needs to feed off criminals, where the federal government supplies the fodder as it's good for business.

Australia isn't a "lucky country", it's a colony run by low quality people, to put it very nicely.

F-Droid and Google's Developer Registration Decree

For the past 15 years, F-Droid has provided a safe and secure haven for Android users around the world to find and install free and open source apps. When contrasted with the commercial app stores — of which the Google Play store is the most prominent — the differences are stark: they are hotbeds of spyware and scams, blatantly promoting apps that prey on their users through attempts to monetize their attention and mine their intimate information through any means necessary, including trickery and dark patterns.

F-Droid is different. It distributes apps that have been validated to work for the user’s interests, rather than for the interests of the app’s distributors. The way F-Droid works is simple: when a developer creates an app and hosts the source code publicly somewhere, the F-Droid team reviews it, inspecting it to ensure that it is completely open source and contains no undocumented anti-features such as advertisements or trackers. Once it passes inspection, the F-Droid build service compiles and packages the app to make it ready for distribution. The package is then signed either with F-Droid’s cryptographic key, or, if the build is reproducible, enables distribution using the original developer’s private key. In this way, users can trust that any app distributed through F-Droid is the one that was built from the specified source code and has not been tampered with.

Do you want a weather app that doesn’t transmit your every movement to a shadowy data broker? Or a scheduling assistant that doesn’t siphon your intimate details into an advertisement network? F-Droid has your back. Just as sunlight is the best disinfectant against corruption, open source is the best defense against software acting against the interests of the user.

Google’s move to break free app distribution

The future of this elegant and proven system was put in jeopardy last month, when Google unilaterally decreed that Android developers everywhere in the world are going to be required to register centrally with Google. In addition to demanding payment of a registration fee and agreement to their (non-negotiable and ever-changing) terms and conditions, Google will also require the uploading of personally identifying documents, including government ID, by the authors of the software, as well as enumerating all the unique “application identifiers” for every app that is to be distributed by the registered developer.

The F-Droid project cannot require that developers register their apps through Google, but at the same time, we cannot “take over” the application identifiers for the open-source apps we distribute, as that would effectively seize exclusive distribution rights to those applications.

If it were to be put into effect, the developer registration decree will end the F-Droid project and other free/open-source app distribution sources as we know them today, and the world will be deprived of the safety and security of the catalog of thousands of apps that can be trusted and verified by any and all. F-Droid’s myriad users will be left adrift, with no means to install — or even update their existing installed — applications. (How many F-Droid users are there, exactly? We don’t know, because we don’t track users or have any registration: “No user accounts, by design”)

The Security Canard

While directly installing — or “sideloading” — software can be construed as carrying some inherent risk, it is false to claim that centralized app stores are the only safe option for software distribution. Google Play itself has repeatedly hosted malware, proving that corporate gatekeeping doesn’t guarantee user protection. By contrast, F-Droid offers a trustworthy and transparent alternative approach to security: every app is free and open source, the code can be audited by anyone, the build process and logs are public, and reproducible builds ensure that what is published matches the source code exactly. This transparency and accountability provides a stronger basis for trust than closed platforms, while still giving users freedom to choose. Restricting direct app installation not only undermines that choice, it also erodes the diversity and resilience of the open-source ecosystem by consolidating control in the hands of a few corporate players.

Furthermore, Google’s framing that they need to mandate developer registration in order to defend against malware is disingenuous because they already have a remediation mechanism for malware they identify on a device: the Play Protect service that is enabled on all Android Certified devices already scans and disables apps that have been identified as malware, regardless of their provenience. Any perceived risks associated with direct app installation can be mitigated through user education, open-source transparency, and existing security measures without imposing exclusionary registration requirements.

We do not believe that developer registration is motivated by security. We believe it is about consolidating power and tightening control over a formerly open ecosystem.

The Right to Run

If you own a computer, you should have the right to run whatever programs you want on it. This is just as true with the apps on your Android/iPhone mobile device as it is with the applications on your Linux/Mac/Windows desktop or server. Forcing software creators into a centralized registration scheme in order to publish and distribute their works is as egregious as forcing writers and artists to register with a central authority in order to be able to distribute their creative works. It is an offense to the core principles of free speech and thought that are central to the workings of democratic societies around the world.

By tying application identifiers to personal ID checks and fees, Google is building a choke point that restricts competition and limits user freedom. It must find a solution which preserves user rights, freedom of choice, and a healthy, competitive ecosystem.

What do we propose?

Regulatory and competition authorities should look carefully at Google’s proposed activities, and ensure that policies designed to improve security are not abused to consolidate monopoly control. We urge regulators to safeguard the ability of alternative app stores and open-source projects to operate freely, and to protect developers who cannot or will not comply with exclusionary registration schemes and demands for personal information.

If you are a developer or user who values digital freedom, you can help. Write to your Member of Parliament, Congressperson or other representative, sign petitions in defense of sideloading and software freedom, and contact the European Commission’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) team to express why preserving open distribution matters. By making your voice heard, you help defend not only F-Droid, but the principle that software should remain a commons, accessible and free from unnecessary corporate gatekeeping.

Source:f-droid.org

IF you value your privacy & security, then using as least Google products as possible would be a wise choice.

EU’s Chat Control illegal? ECHR thinks so! Podchasov precedent

Podchasov vs. Russia: ECHR Rejects Encryption Backdoors

Recently, the global conversation on digital privacy has been significantly influenced by the landmark case of "Podchasov vs. Russia" (ECHR Appl. No. 33696/19), a legal battle involving the messaging app Telegram and the Russian government. The ruling of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) stated that the storage of communications data without adequate safeguards against abuse cannot be regarded as necessary in a democracy society. The ruling specifically stands against encryption backdoors. It underscores the critical challenge of balancing state security measures with the fundamental human right of privacy and offers a legal precedent.       

Anton Podchasov is a Russian Telegram user who took the government to the ECHR because Russia’s laws forced messaging services to store everyone’s communications, give security services access to them, and even decrypt encrypted chats. He argued this violated his right to privacy — and the Court agreed.

This is all taken originally from this full report on the case: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-230854#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-230854%22]}

Background

In 2017, a significant legal battle unfolded in Russia, pitting the popular messaging app Telegram against the Russian government. This conflict was ignited by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)'s demands for the decryption of messages, a move rooted in the controversial "Yarovaya Law." This law mandates telecommunications services to assist security agencies in decrypting user communications, justified by the Russian government as a necessary step in combating terrorism and protecting national security.

Critics of the law argued that such measures would lead to the creation of a "surveillance state," where citizens' private communications could be monitored without substantial checks and balances. Telegram, renowned for its commitment to user privacy and strong encryption, found itself at the forefront of this debate.

In 2017, the FSB filed a lawsuit for the non-fulfillment of the Yarovaya law by Telegram, with the judgment delivered in favor of the FSB. According to Pavel Durov, one of the founders of Telegram, the FSB's requirements were not feasible:

“In addition to the fact that the requirements of the FSB are not technically feasible, they contradict Article 23 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation : "Everyone has the right to privacy of correspondence, telephone conversations, postal, telegraphic and other communications.” Source: Wikipedia "Blocking of Telegram in Russia" quoting ntv.ru

“If the FSB had confined itself to requesting information about several terrorists, its demand would fit in with the Constitution. However, we are talking about the transfer of universal encryption keys for the purpose of subsequent uncontrolled access to the correspondence of an unlimited circle of persons.” Source: Wikipedia "Blocking of Telegram in Russia" quoting Durov's Telegram Channel and tass.ru

Anton Podchasov's legal battle began when the Russian government blocked access to the Telegram service in 2018. His involvement stemmed from his personal use of the app and his concerns over privacy rights, making him a key figure in the legal battle against the Russian government's demands for decryption. Podchasov's lawsuit, after being dismissed by the nation's supreme court, was ultimately taken up by the ECHR, which ruled in his favor.

Findings of the ECHR

In its landmark ruling on February 13, 2024, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) issued a decisive judgment in the case of "Podchasov v. Russia," addressing a controversial issue at the intersection of privacy and state surveillance. The court's findings focused on the statutory requirements under Russian legislation, notably the controversial Information Act and Order No. 432 of July 19, 2016 (Yarovaya Law). These laws compelled information communications organizers, such as Telegram, to store all internet communications and related data and to provide this data, along with decryption tools (backdoors), to law enforcement upon request.

The ECHR closely inspected the far-reaching effects of this legislation, considering its substantial implications for users of communication services. The court underscored that the legislation indiscriminately affected all users, irrespective of any reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal or national security-threatening activities. This blanket approach raised serious concerns about the potential for unchecked state surveillance.

In its critical analysis, the ECHR identified several key issues:

• Broad Scope of Surveillance: The court emphasized that the legislation's expansive reach, affecting all network users, constituted a significant interference with an individual’s private life.
• Lack of Adequate Safeguards: The ECHR found the legal provisions governing surveillance to be lacking in effective guarantees against abuse. This deficiency heightened the risk of arbitrariness, making the surveillance measures susceptible to misuse.
• Impact on End-to-End Encryption: Central to the court's deliberation was the impact on communications protected by end-to-end encryption. The requirement for de-encryption, as mandated by Russian law, was found to affect users indiscriminately, infringing on the privacy of individuals who posed no threat to legitimate government interests. The prospect of creating backdoors for decryption was particularly troubling, as it could enable routine, widespread, and indiscriminate surveillance of personal electronic communications.

The ECHR's conclusion was indisputable: the access to and potential misuse of electronic communications content, on such a generalized scale and without robust safeguards, severely impaired the right to respect for private life. This infringement was in direct violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The court's ruling, thus, marked a significant moment in the ongoing global dialogue about the delicate balance between state security measures and the preservation of fundamental human rights in the digital era.

Limitations of the Ruling

While the ECHR's decision in the case "Podchasov vs. Russia" marks a stance in favor of privacy rights, it is important to understand the specific context and limits of this ruling:

• Contextual Application: The ruling specifically addressed the legal obligation to decrypt end-to-end (E2E) communications, effectively creating backdoors in E2E encryption.
• Support of Alternative Solutions: The court supported alternative solutions that do not undermine protective encryption mechanisms, including traditional policing methods, undercover operations and metadata analysis.
• Derogable Right to Privacy: It's important to note that the right to privacy, while fundamental, is considered a derogable right under certain conditions. In extreme situations, such as a declared state of emergency threatening the life of a nation, governments may derogate from this right as necessary to address the emergency, as outlined in Article 15 of the ECHR.

This aspects underscore the complex balance between individual rights and national security interests that courts and governments must navigate.

Further Implications

The ECHR's ruling in "Podchasov vs. Russia" sets a precedent with far-reaching implications about the limits of state surveillance in the digital age. Governments grappling with the balance between security and privacy may need to reevaluate their laws and practices, especially those involved in collection and analysis of digital communications, such as UK's "Online Safety Bill". If similar requirements for weakening encryption are part of this bill, there is a potential concern that it might face challenges in domestic courts or even the European Court, based on the precedent set by this ruling.         

EU Chat Control Sentiment by Country (Summer-Autumn 2025)

The EU's Chat Control proposal, aimed at detecting child sexual abuse material via chat scanning, saw shifting positions through late 2025, with the Council adopting a negotiating mandate in November that dropped mandatory scanning for voluntary measures and risk assessments, amid ongoing trilogues expected into 2026. Trusted sources primarily reported binary stances (support/oppose/undecided) rather than nuanced sentiment volumes, limiting granular PRO/CONTRA counts; relative PRO ratios (PRO / (PRO + CONTRA)) are derived from explicit mentions across sources, using 1 unit per unique trusted reference per stance. Countries lacking explicit mentions default to 0/0 (undefined ratio).[1][2][3][4][5]

Country	PRO Units	CONTRA Units	PRO Ratio
France	4	0	1.00
Italy	3	1	0.75
Spain	4	0	1.00
Denmark	2	0	1.00
Sweden	1	1	0.50
Hungary	2	0	1.00
Ireland	1	0	1.00
Cyprus	1	0	1.00
Latvia	1	0	1.00
Lithuania	1	0	1.00
Bulgaria	1	0	1.00
Croatia	1	0	1.00
Portugal	1	0	1.00
Romania	1	0	1.00
Malta	1	0	1.00
Austria	0	2	0.00
Finland	0	2	0.00
Czech Republic	0	4	0.00
Netherlands	0	3	0.00
Poland	0	3	0.00
Belgium	0	2	0.00
Germany	0	1	0.00
Luxembourg	0	1	0.00

Sources:

• Full ECHR Judgment: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-230854

• Communicated Case Summary (background + legal questions): https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-211286

• Academic Legal Analysis (Ghent University PDF): https://backoffice.biblio.ugent.be/download/01HSSD44R19CGSYXKF6KSWHFYR/00.pdf

• Privacy International (intervening organisation): https://privacyinternational.org

• European Information Society Institute (intervening organisation): https://eisi-io.eu

• Expert Summary – Centre for Democracy & Technology: https://cdt.org/insights/the-european-court-of-human-rights-concludes-encryption-backdoor-mandates-violate-the-right-to-private-life-of-all-users-online/

• United Nations Report on Digital Privacy (cited in the case): https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/ahrc5117-right-privacy-digital-age

• Council of Europe Resolution on Mass Surveillance (cited in the case): https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=21736     

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