A look into Corporate fraud in Australia, Stranglehold of Monopolies, Telecom's Oppression, Biased Law System, Corporate influence in politics, Industrial Relations disadvantaging workers, Outsourcing Australian Jobs, Offshore Banking, Petrochemical company domination, Invisibly Visible.
It's not what you see, it's what goes on behind the scenes. Australia, the warrantless colony.
Note: Site has more info in desktop mode or 'web version' as seen at bottom of page, when on smartphone.
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (ABN: 122 104 616)
Australia's Prime Minister (CEO) Tony Abbott : "Australia is Open for Business"
Australians are no longer in a democracy but rather under a socialist state.
In many instances you don't have a 'right' to 'free speech', but rather you have to ask for permission to protest.
Image: U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement
Briefly,
404 Media has obtained material that explains how Tangles and Webloc,
two surveillance systems ICE (Immigration & Customs Enforcement) recently purchased, work.
Webloc can track
phones without a warrant and follow their owners home or to their
employer.
A social media and phone surveillance system ICE bought access to is
designed to monitor a city neighbourhood or block for mobile phones,
track the movements of those devices and their owners over time, and
follow them from their places of work to home or other locations,
according to material that describes how the system works obtained by
404 Media.
Commercial location data, in this case acquired from
hundreds of millions of phones via a company called Penlink, can be
queried without a warrant, according to an internal ICE legal analysis
shared with 404 Media.
The purchase comes squarely during ICE’s mass deportation effort and continued crackdown on protected speech, alarming civil liberties experts and raising questions on what exactly ICE will use the surveillance system for.
This is a very dangerous tool in the hands of an out-of-control agency.
At the end of the day the surveillance on the general population is going to get worse and worse with ZERO oversight.
Historically, royal commissions in this colony are a compromised ‘money for mates’ rort of taxpayer funds.
The corruption of the colony's Anglo-Masonic legal system goes above the comprehension of the ‘average Joe’, exactly the way the system wants it to be.
Edward I
The previous royal commission into the banking and financial services institutions was a deliberately useless farce, where approx 10,000 signatories to it never obtained a remedy.
The Wood Royal Commission on paedophilia, totally useless to the victims of paedophiles in positions of power.
Will the (alleged) ‘royal commission into antisemitism’ ask the fundamental question of why is there a perception/sentiment of antisemitism or is it really anti-Zionism?
Protests in Melbourne
The so called commission will not entertain why is Australia importing Islamic fundamentalists that later carry out heinous actions or incite hate or violence, because it's acceptable if it's against Buddhist, Hindus or Christians?
The so called commission will not entertain the fact that the Sajid Akram was a 'Person of Interest' and should have not been given the right to reside in Australia, where others have been denied entry of exercising their ‘free speech’ right in this colony.
The so called commission will not entertain the fact that Sajid Akram should have not been given a gun licence by the 'authorities'.
Will the commission obtain evidence that in the 1200’s the Jews were plunging the English population into poverty through a practice called usury, that being making loans that are seen as unfairly enriching the lender?
Will the commission obtain evidence that condemning taking advantage of others' misfortunes, was brought in under a law in 1275 called ‘Statute of the Jewry’ by Edward I of England?
Usury is still practised today and will be well into the future.
Will the so called royal commission look into the history why the Jews were kicked out of Egypt or Spain?
Will the so called royal commission look into the actions of modern day Israel against other nations and the correlation against Zionism?
See video: of the title: Rabbi EXPOSES Israel in Bondi Beach Attacks
Keeping in mind that the matter of antisemitism vs anti-Zionism has already been before the Federal Court of Australia in 2025, under Wertheim v Haddad. Where the following was stated:
Will the so called commission do a deep dive into Zionism?
So, the royal commission will be into 'antisemitism' and not into the 'Bondi Beach Massacre', where the people will be blamed for (alleged) antisemitism, but an inquiry into the Bondi Beach massacre will pin the blame on the authorities at a fair few levels.
Quite simply put, the Bondi Beach shooting on 14th of December 2025 could have been avoided, where the federal government is negligent in its actions, or inaction.
Over the last few decades the Australian government, has been importing all sorts of trash from all over the planet into this colony, meaning other nations low quality, low value humans, under whatever label.
MANY of these humans do not contribute to society in a positive manner, but rather leech from it, or have the only intention to commit crime for a living.
Sajid Akram, pictured above, should have never been let into the colony, nor should he have ever been given a gun licence, where this is the so called ‘failure of government’.
The Australian government, over the years, has had many different policies in place with regards to importing corporate fodder into Australia.
The racists in government implemented the ‘White Australia policy’ from the beginning of federation until the 1970s.
The policy now is to flood Australia with low quality immigrants, turning a blind eye to their criminal history from their place of origin.
What is worse, for the greater good od society, is that it’s quite clear that the courts ‘support’ these criminals, letting them back out on the streets, as the system requires repeat offenders in order for it to prosper.
There are other aspects to the actions of the father Sajid Akram and son Naveed Akram combo, which are outside the scope of this article.
The sole purpose that corporations exist for is not to create a product or service but rather to generate profit for the owners/stakeholders from this product or service.
In a fair few instances health of the consumers is not on the cards, with food-like products from corporations like McDonald's, Wendy's, Donut King, et al.
A global 'big pharma' giant has recently put together a drug that allegedly stops people from smoking.
So what they need to do now is to spruik their 'wares' to medical practitioners, where kickbacks are given for every prescription handed out the patient 'customer'/consumer.
That's all very nice, BUT the problem is that a confidential industry insider stated that the drug doesn't work, where the company that produced it, knows that.
Sounds familiar?
A few years ago the same corporation put out a drug that was forced or maybe 'enticed' onto the people, where it did not confer immunity therefore it was falsely labelled as a 'vaccine'.
Naturally it would a good idea to seek a professional medial opinion on this drug from a medical practitioner that has no vested interest in the product.
Encrypted messaging developers may be considered hostile actors in the UK
An independent review of national security law warns of overreach
Encryption repeatedly targeted by UK lawmakers
Developers
of apps that use end-to-end encryption to protect private
communications could be considered hostile actors in the UK.
That
is the stark warning from Jonathan Hall KC, the government’s Independent
Reviewer of State Threats Legislation and Independent Reviewer of
Terrorism Legislation, in a new report on national security laws.
In
his independent review of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act
and the newly implemented National Security Act, Hall KC highlights the
incredibly broad scope of powers granted to authorities.
He warns that developers of apps like Signal and WhatsApp could
technically fall within the legal definition of "hostile activity"
simply because their technology "make[s] it more difficult for UK
security and intelligence agencies to monitor communications."
He
writes: "It is a reasonable assumption that this would be in the
interests of a foreign state even if though the foreign state has never
contemplated this potential advantage."
The report also notes that
journalists "carrying confidential information" or material "personally
embarrassing to the Prime Minister on the eve of important treaty
negotiations" could face similar scrutiny.
While it remains to be
seen how this report will influence future amendments, it comes at a
time of increasing pressure from lawmakers against encryption.
Encryption under siege
While the report’s strong
wording may come as a shock, it doesn't exist in a vacuum. Encrypted
apps are increasingly in the crosshairs of UK lawmakers, with several
pieces of legislation targeting the technology.
Most notably,
Apple was served with a technical capability notice under the
Investigatory Powers Act (IPA) demanding it weaken the encryption
protecting iCloud data. That legal standoff led the tech giant to
disable its Advanced Data Protection instead of creating a backdoor.
The
Online Safety Act is already well known for its controversial age
verification requirements. However, its most contentious provisions have
yet to be fully implemented, and experts fear these could undermine encryption even further.
The potential risks of the
Act's tougher stance on encryption were only briefly mentioned during
the discussion, suggesting a stark disconnect between MPs and security
experts.
Olivier Crépin-Leblond, of the Internet Society, told
TechRadar he was disappointed by the outcome of the debate. "When it
came to Client Side Scanning (CSS), most felt this could be one of the
'easy technological fixes' that could help law enforcement greatly,
especially when they showed their frustration at Facebook rolling
end-to-end encryption," he said.
"It's clearly not understood that any such software could fall prey to hackers."
It is clear that for many lawmakers, encryption
is viewed primarily as an obstacle to law enforcement. This stands in
sharp contrast to the view of digital rights experts, who stress that
the technology is vital for protecting privacy and security in an online
landscape where cyberattacks are rising.
"The government
signposts end-to-end encryption as a threat, but what they fail to
consider is that breaking it would be a threat to our national security
too," Jemimah Steinfeld, CEO of Index on Censorship, told TechRadar.
She
also added that this ignores encryption's vital role for dissidents,
journalists, and domestic abuse victims, "not to mention the general
population who should be afforded basic privacy."
With the battle
lines drawn, we can expect a challenging year ahead for services like
Signal and WhatsApp. Both companies have previously pledged to leave the UK market rather than compromise their users' privacy and security.
Source:techradar
The actions of a global 'Nanny State' agenda, nothing to do with 'child safety'.
There’s only a few that dare to venture outside of the ‘approved’ narrative.
The narrative now, after this (deliberate?) 'failure of government', is all about more stringent gun controls, and anti-Semitism and now anti-Zionism or anti an ideology like Communism.
After the Port Arthur incident, stringent gun control came to Australia, but it didn’t curb gun crime.
The ‘real’ criminals still had guns.
Australia’s authorities are inherently corrupt, where their corrupt actions have devastating effects on the general population.
One action of the corrupt government is that it knowingly import terrorists, for example the ones that (allegedly) committed the mass shooting in Bondi on the 14th of December 2025.
That’s one example on the extreme side.
Another example is that the federal government deliberately imports low quality humans from all over the world as (alleged) ‘refugees’ that once they are here, they commit criminal actions against the good population of Australia, where the machete attacks in Victoria are a prime example.
This ‘problem’ is not going away anytime soon, where in fact it’s going to get worse, for the people, and 'better' for the legal system, as they’ll have plenty of new ‘customers’ as that’s what it’s all about.
So, why is Australia importing terrorists?
Australia’s corrupt Anglo-Masonic legal system needs to feed off criminals, where the federal government supplies the fodder as it's good for business.
Australia isn't a "lucky country", it's a colony run by low quality people, to put it very nicely.
For the past 15 years, F-Droid
has provided a safe and secure haven for Android users around the world to
find and install free and open source apps. When contrasted with the
commercial app stores — of which the Google Play store is the most prominent
— the differences are stark: they are hotbeds of spyware and scams,
blatantly promoting apps that prey on their users through attempts to
monetize their attention and mine their intimate information through any
means necessary, including trickery and dark
patterns.
F-Droid is different. It distributes apps that have been validated to work
for the user’s interests, rather than for the interests of the app’s
distributors. The way F-Droid works is simple: when a developer creates an
app and hosts the source code publicly somewhere, the F-Droid team reviews
it, inspecting it to ensure that it is completely open source and contains
no undocumented anti-features
such as advertisements or trackers. Once it passes inspection, the F-Droid
build service compiles and packages the app to make it ready for
distribution. The package is then signed either with F-Droid’s cryptographic
key, or, if the build is
reproducible, enables
distribution using the original developer’s private key. In this way, users
can trust that any app distributed through F-Droid is the one that was built
from the specified source code and has not been tampered with.
Do you want a weather app that doesn’t transmit your every
movement
to a shadowy data broker? Or a scheduling assistant that doesn’t siphon
your intimate
details
into an advertisement network? F-Droid has your back. Just as sunlight is
the best disinfectant against corruption, open source is the best defense
against software acting against the interests of the user.
Google’s move to break free app distribution
The future of this elegant and proven system was put in jeopardy last month,
when Google unilaterally
decreed
that Android developers everywhere in the world are going to be required to
register centrally with Google. In addition to demanding payment of a
registration fee and agreement to their (non-negotiable and ever-changing)
terms and conditions, Google will also require the uploading of personally
identifying
documents,
including government ID, by the authors of the software, as well as
enumerating
all the unique “application identifiers” for every app that is to be
distributed by the registered developer.
The F-Droid project cannot require that developers register their apps
through Google, but at the same time, we cannot “take over” the application
identifiers for the open-source apps we distribute, as that would
effectively seize exclusive distribution rights to those applications.
If it were to be put into effect, the developer registration decree will end
the F-Droid project and other free/open-source app distribution sources as
we know them today, and the world will be deprived of the safety and
security of the catalog of thousands of apps that can be trusted and
verified by any and all. F-Droid’s myriad users will be left adrift, with no
means to install — or even update their existing installed —
applications. (How many F-Droid users are there, exactly? We don’t know,
because we don’t track users or have any registration: “No user accounts,
by design”)
The Security Canard
While directly installing — or “sideloading” — software can be construed as
carrying some inherent risk, it is false to claim that centralized app
stores are the only safe option for software distribution. Google Play
itself has
repeatedlyhosted
malware, proving that corporate gatekeeping doesn’t guarantee user
protection. By contrast, F-Droid offers a trustworthy and transparent
alternative approach to security: every app is free and open source, the
code can be audited by anyone, the build process and logs are public, and
reproducible builds ensure that what is published matches the source code
exactly. This transparency and accountability provides a stronger basis
for trust than closed platforms, while still giving users freedom to
choose. Restricting direct app installation not only undermines that choice,
it also erodes the diversity and resilience of the open-source ecosystem by
consolidating control in the hands of a few corporate players.
Furthermore, Google’s framing that they need to mandate developer
registration in order to defend against malware is disingenuous because they
already have a remediation mechanism for malware they identify on a
device: the Play Protect
service that is
enabled on all Android Certified devices already scans and disables apps
that have been identified as malware, regardless of their provenience. Any
perceived risks associated with direct app installation can be mitigated
through user education, open-source transparency, and existing security
measures without imposing exclusionary registration requirements.
We do not believe that developer registration is motivated by security. We
believe it is about consolidating power and tightening control over a
formerly open ecosystem.
The Right to Run
If you own a computer, you should have the right to run whatever programs
you want on it. This is just as true with the apps on your Android/iPhone
mobile device as it is with the applications on your Linux/Mac/Windows
desktop or server. Forcing software creators into a centralized registration
scheme in order to publish and distribute their works is as egregious as
forcing writers and artists to register with a central authority in order to
be able to distribute their creative works. It is an offense to the core
principles of free speech and thought that are central to the workings of
democratic societies around the world.
By tying application identifiers to personal ID checks and fees, Google is
building a choke point that restricts competition and limits user
freedom. It must find a solution which preserves user rights, freedom of
choice, and a healthy, competitive ecosystem.
What do we propose?
Regulatory and competition authorities should look carefully at Google’s
proposed activities, and ensure that policies designed to improve security
are not abused to consolidate monopoly control. We urge regulators to
safeguard the ability of alternative app stores and open-source projects to
operate freely, and to protect developers who cannot or will not comply with
exclusionary registration schemes and demands for personal information.
If you are a developer or user who values digital freedom, you can
help. Write to your Member of
Parliament,
Congressperson
or other representative, sign petitions in defense of sideloading and
software freedom, and
contact the
European Commission’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) team to express why
preserving open distribution matters. By making your voice heard, you help
defend not only F-Droid, but the principle that software should remain a
commons, accessible and free from unnecessary corporate gatekeeping.
Source:f-droid.org
IF you value your privacy & security, then using as least Google products as possible would be a wise choice.
Podchasov vs. Russia: ECHR Rejects Encryption Backdoors
Recently, the global conversation on digital privacy has been
significantly influenced by the landmark case of "Podchasov vs.
Russia" (ECHR Appl. No. 33696/19), a legal battle involving the
messaging app Telegram and the Russian government. The ruling of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) stated that the storage of
communications data without adequate safeguards against abuse cannot
be regarded as necessary in a democracy society. The ruling
specifically stands against encryption backdoors. It underscores the
critical challenge of balancing state security measures with the
fundamental human right of privacy and offers a legal precedent.
Anton Podchasov is a Russian Telegram user who took the government to the ECHR because Russia’s laws forced messaging services to store everyone’s communications, give security services access to them, and even decrypt encrypted chats. He argued this violated his right to privacy — and the Court agreed.
In 2017, a significant legal battle unfolded in Russia, pitting the
popular messaging app Telegram against the Russian government. This
conflict was ignited by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)'s
demands for the decryption of messages, a move rooted in the
controversial "Yarovaya Law." This law mandates telecommunications
services to assist security agencies in decrypting user
communications, justified by the Russian government as a necessary
step in combating terrorism and protecting national security.
Critics of the law argued that such measures would lead to the
creation of a "surveillance state," where citizens' private
communications could be monitored without substantial checks and
balances. Telegram, renowned for its commitment to user privacy and
strong encryption, found itself at the forefront of this debate.
In 2017, the FSB filed a lawsuit for the non-fulfillment of the
Yarovaya law by Telegram, with the judgment delivered in favor of the
FSB. According to Pavel Durov, one of the founders of Telegram, the
FSB's requirements were not feasible:
“In addition to the fact that the requirements of the FSB are not
technically feasible, they contradict Article 23 of the Constitution
of the Russian Federation : "Everyone has the right to privacy of
correspondence, telephone conversations, postal, telegraphic and other
communications.”
Source: Wikipedia "Blocking of Telegram in Russia" quoting
ntv.ru
“If the FSB had confined itself to requesting information about
several terrorists, its demand would fit in with the Constitution.
However, we are talking about the transfer of universal encryption
keys for the purpose of subsequent uncontrolled access to the
correspondence of an unlimited circle of persons.”
Source: Wikipedia "Blocking of Telegram in Russia" quoting Durov's
Telegram Channel and tass.ru
Anton Podchasov's legal battle began when the Russian government
blocked access to the Telegram service in 2018. His involvement
stemmed from his personal use of the app and his concerns over privacy
rights, making him a key figure in the legal battle against the
Russian government's demands for decryption. Podchasov's lawsuit,
after being dismissed by the nation's supreme court, was ultimately
taken up by the ECHR, which ruled in his favor.
Findings of the ECHR
In its landmark ruling on February 13, 2024, the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) issued a decisive judgment in the case of
"Podchasov v. Russia," addressing a controversial issue at the
intersection of privacy and state surveillance. The court's findings
focused on the statutory requirements under Russian legislation,
notably the controversial Information Act and Order No. 432 of July
19, 2016 (Yarovaya Law). These laws compelled information
communications organizers, such as Telegram, to store all internet
communications and related data and to provide this data, along with
decryption tools (backdoors), to law enforcement upon request.
The ECHR closely inspected the far-reaching effects of this
legislation, considering its substantial implications for users of
communication services. The court underscored that the legislation
indiscriminately affected all users, irrespective of any reasonable
suspicion of involvement in criminal or national security-threatening
activities. This blanket approach raised serious concerns about the
potential for unchecked state surveillance.
In its critical analysis, the ECHR identified several key issues:
Broad Scope of Surveillance: The
court emphasized that the legislation's expansive reach, affecting
all network users, constituted a significant interference with an
individual’s private life.
Lack of Adequate Safeguards: The
ECHR found the legal provisions governing surveillance to be lacking
in effective guarantees against abuse. This deficiency heightened
the risk of arbitrariness, making the surveillance measures
susceptible to misuse.
Impact on End-to-End Encryption:
Central to the court's deliberation was the impact on communications
protected by end-to-end encryption. The requirement for
de-encryption, as mandated by Russian law, was found to affect users
indiscriminately, infringing on the privacy of individuals who posed
no threat to legitimate government interests. The prospect of
creating backdoors for decryption was particularly troubling, as it
could enable routine, widespread, and indiscriminate surveillance of
personal electronic communications.
The ECHR's conclusion was indisputable: the access to and potential
misuse of electronic communications content, on such a generalized
scale and without robust safeguards, severely impaired the right to
respect for private life. This infringement was in direct violation of
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The court's
ruling, thus, marked a significant moment in the ongoing global
dialogue about the delicate balance between state security measures
and the preservation of fundamental human rights in the digital era.
Limitations of the Ruling
While the ECHR's decision in the case "Podchasov vs. Russia" marks a
stance in favor of privacy rights, it is important to understand the
specific context and limits of this ruling:
Contextual Application: The ruling
specifically addressed the legal obligation to decrypt end-to-end
(E2E) communications, effectively creating backdoors in E2E
encryption.
Support of Alternative Solutions:
The court supported alternative solutions that do not undermine
protective encryption mechanisms, including traditional policing
methods, undercover operations and metadata analysis.
Derogable Right to Privacy: It's
important to note that the right to privacy, while fundamental, is
considered a derogable right under certain conditions. In extreme
situations, such as a declared state of emergency threatening the
life of a nation, governments may derogate from this right as
necessary to address the emergency, as outlined in Article 15 of the
ECHR.
This aspects underscore the complex balance between individual rights
and national security interests that courts and governments must
navigate.
Further Implications
The ECHR's ruling in "Podchasov vs. Russia" sets a precedent with
far-reaching implications about the limits of state surveillance in
the digital age. Governments grappling with the balance between
security and privacy may need to reevaluate their laws and practices,
especially those involved in collection and analysis of digital
communications, such as UK's "Online Safety Bill". If similar
requirements for weakening encryption are part of this bill, there is
a potential concern that it might face challenges in domestic courts
or even the European Court, based on the precedent set by this ruling.
EU Chat Control Sentiment by Country (Summer-Autumn 2025)
The EU's Chat Control proposal, aimed at detecting child sexual
abuse material via chat scanning, saw shifting positions through late
2025, with the Council adopting a negotiating mandate in November that
dropped mandatory scanning for voluntary measures and risk assessments,
amid ongoing trilogues expected into 2026. Trusted sources primarily
reported binary stances (support/oppose/undecided) rather than nuanced
sentiment volumes, limiting granular PRO/CONTRA counts; relative PRO
ratios (PRO / (PRO + CONTRA)) are derived from explicit mentions across
sources, using 1 unit per unique trusted reference per stance. Countries
lacking explicit mentions default to 0/0 (undefined
ratio).[1][2][3][4][5]
As usual there is never one agenda behind any government's dystopian actions.
Governments and corporations around the world are attacking 'netizens' (users of the internet, 'net citizens) for no other reasons than to stifle free speech, then punish people for their 'free speech' and to enact institutional control over the masses.
Quite simply put the social media ban in Australia which is to be enacted in just under a week, to (allegedly) protect the children (of the cannon fodder) will not work.
In any event the people in charge of the masses (truly) do not care about the children of the masses, as they are disposable resources.
IF the authorities truly cared about child safety, then for example there would have been criminal charges laid against the people involved in the Epstein Files a while ago and not being the clown show for what it is.
IF the authorities truly cared about child safety, then the (migrant) child grooming gangs in the UK would have been sorted out a long time ago.
The dark reality is that governments want/need crime to exist, to keep the general population in fear and under control and distracted from the criminal actions of those in government/control.
From its inception, telecommunications was (deliberately) never designed for the masses to be 'private' and certainly not encrypted.
One cannot deny that governments and corporate authorities can and in a lot of cases are, corrupt, e.g. Wikileaks exposing US government corruption.
It is through necessity that software developers have created secure communications that benefit your privacy (and security), keeping communication away from the corrupt people in government, something that does not sit well with them.
They want the pleb's lives to be transparent, yet these so called 'public servants' rule in secrecy and deception.
Their motto is 'nothing to hide nothing to fear', where it goes both ways doesn't it?
The 'chat control' has nothing to do with catching criminals, but rather thwarting the masses 'free speech' as the first perceived enemy of every government is the general population.
In this digital age, 'people' can more easily expose the ('alleged') criminal actions of those in power, which is something they do not want to happen.
INSTEAD of dealing with the accusations by whistleblowers governments 'shoot the messenger', again Wikileaks as an example, how honourable.
ANOTHER farce told by the UK is that they need to implement digital identification to stop illegal immigrant workforce.
Illegal immigration is a border issue and not an administrative card/digital id issue.
Another deliberately misguided action to fool the masses, that will enact fascist institutional control just like in a 1930s style 'Your papers, please' era.
Google is also enacting identification of developers that wish to make software for Android smartphones, saying that this action will prevent apps with malware.
Briefly, as this topic is beyond the scope of this article, this is another farce, as Google already possesses the technology to prevent malware from reaching Android users but chooses not to enable it.
This action is about exposing/doxing developers that create apps that are not conducive to the corporate fascists.
It's ALL about putting 'you' (the masses) into digital slavery.
Remember there WILL be data breaches and it will be YOUR identity that will be exposed, putting you and/or your finances at risk.
MANY content creators have spoken against these actions, where here is just a small collection:
The EU is Destroying Privacy:
What Happens If You Refuse Australia’s Digital ID in 2025?:
The "Digital Omnibus" Is Here: Protect Your Data Now:
EXPOSING Chat Control: The Government's Plan To Kill Free Speech:
Digital ID : Voluntary Now…Mandatory Later?:
Digital ID Australia - Techno Authoritarianism:
We are ALL In Danger!:
Doxing Yourself to (Not) Save Privacy Developers:
End of Encryption: How the EU Wants to Spy on ALL Your Messages: