Computer crime law for Australians

So the people in the corporation conglomerate called the 'Australian Government' have put in a so called law that describes you committing a crime with a tool called computer.

The more relevant sections that could apply to most are items 12 and 28.

All you have to do is prove that the CYBERCRIME ACT 2001 NO. 161, 2001 is not a valid Act.

P.S. 

Don't go to a 'lawyer' they just might tell you that you're on your own, after all they don't really work for you....

Luke 11:52 (New International Version):

"Woe to you experts in the law, because you have taken away the key to knowledge. You yourselves have not entered, and you have hindered those who were entering."

With reference to the above mentioned Act:

12  After section 3L

Insert:

3LA  Person with knowledge of a computer or a computer system to

assist access etc.

 (1) The executing officer may apply to a magistrate for an order

requiring a specified person to provide any information or

assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow the officer to

do one or more of the following:

 (a) access data held in, or accessible from, a computer that is on

warrant premises;

 (b) copy the data to a data storage device;

 (c) convert the data into documentary form.

 (2) The magistrate may grant the order if the magistrate is satisfied

that:

 (a) there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that evidential

material is held in, or is accessible from, the computer; and

 (b) the specified person is:

 (i) reasonably suspected of having committed the offence

stated in the relevant warrant; or

 (ii) the owner or lessee of the computer; or

 (iii) an employee of the owner or lessee of the computer; and

 (c) the specified person has relevant knowledge of:

 (i) the computer or a computer network of which the

computer forms a part; or

 (ii) measures applied to protect data held in, or accessible

from, the computer.

 (3) A person commits an offence if the person fails to comply with the

order.

Penalty: 6 months imprisonment.

3LB  Accessing data held on other premises—notification to

occupier of that premises

 (1) If: Law enforcement powers relating to electronically stored data   Schedule 2

   

Cybercrime Act 2001       No. 161, 2001            19

 (a) data that is held on premises other than the warrant premises

is accessed under subsection 3L(1); and

 (b) it is practicable to notify the occupier of the other premises

that the data has been accessed under a warrant;

the executing officer must:

 (c) do so as soon as practicable; and

 (d) if the executing officer has arranged, or intends to arrange,

for continued access to the data under subsection 3L(1A) or

(2)—include that information in the notification.

 (2) A notification under subsection (1) must include sufficient

information to allow the occupier of the other premises to contact

the executing officer.

28  After section 201

Insert:

201A  Person with knowledge of a computer or a computer system

to assist access etc.

 (1) An executing officer may apply to a magistrate for an order

requiring a specified person to provide any information or

assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow the officer to

do one or more of the following:

 (a) access data held in, or accessible from, a computer that is on

warrant premises;

 (b) copy the data to a data storage device;

 (c) convert the data into documentary form. Law enforcement powers relating to electronically stored data   Schedule 2

Cybercrime Act 2001       No. 161, 2001            23

 (2) The magistrate may grant the order if the magistrate is satisfied

that:

 (a) there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that evidential

material is held in, or is accessible from, the computer; and

 (b) the specified person is:

 (i) reasonably suspected of having committed the offence

stated in the relevant warrant; or

 (ii) the owner or lessee of the computer; or

 (iii) an employee of the owner or lessee of the computer; and

 (c) the specified person has relevant knowledge of:

 (i) the computer or a computer network of which the

computer forms a part; or

 (ii) measures applied to protect data held in, or accessible

from, the computer.

 (3) A person commits an offence if the person fails to comply with the

order.

Penalty: 6 months imprisonment.

201B  Accessing data held on other premises—notification to

occupier of that premises

 (1) If:

 (a) data that is held on premises other than the warrant premises

is accessed under subsection 201(1); and

 (b) it is practicable to notify the occupier of the other premises

that the data has been accessed under a warrant;

the executing officer must:

 (c) do so as soon as practicable; and

 (d) if the executing officer has arranged, or intends to arrange,

for continued access to the data under subsection 201(1A) or

(2)—include that information in the notification.

 (2) A notification under subsection (1) must include sufficient

information to allow the occupier of the other premises to contact

the executing officer.

Source: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/ca2001112/sch1.html

Centrelink uses Nigerian scammers to write letters?

It's NOT enough that Centrelink has fraudulently sent out debt collection letters to welfare recipients,

(http://corpau.blogspot.com.au/2017/01/pay-or-face-debt-collector-what.html)

now the people must put up this sort of abuse:

Police already committing criminal offences against new metadata laws

The good people of Australia MUST know that the government has been collecting and storing their data for quite some time, where only now (Good Friday, 2017) the law has caught up and been officially implemented.

Police commit many criminal actions against the general populous daily, and with regards to privacy breaches the numbers are staggering where they are hidden from the masses and for very good reasons.

ONLY one case has made it out into the public eye regarding a journalist having privacy breached with regards to the new metadata laws.

The people in government write laws where if a member of the public commits a 'criminal' offence the people in government obtain a financial remedy.

Since this journalist is a VICTIM of criminal actions by police, the new metadata laws must contain a remedy for the victim within the act, as they do for government bodies..

UNLESS of course the people in government who have written the laws regard the good people of Australia as slaves or enemies of the state.

Let's see what 'remedy' the journalist obtains being the victim of police criminal actions.

This is what smh.com.au wrote on 28 April 2017 under the headline:

Police illegally obtained journalist's phone records under new metadata retention regime

The Australian Federal Police illegally obtained a journalist's phone records under the Turnbull government's new metadata retention regime, the agency announced on Friday.

The breach took place as part of an investigation into a leak of confidential police material - and the incident will now be investigated by the Commonwealth Ombudsman.

AFP commissioner Andrew Colvin said the police officers investigating the leak did not realise they were required to obtain a warrant to access the journalist's metadata.

"This was human error. It should not have occurred. The AFP takes it very seriously and we take full responsibility for breaching the Act," Mr Colvin said.

 

AFP commissioner Andrew Colvin. Photo: Alex Ellinghausen

"There was no ill will or malice or bad intent by the officers involved who breached the Act. But simply it was a mistake."

The journalist in question had not been informed their data had been accessed, Mr Colvin said, due to sensitivities around the ongoing investigation into the leak.

The breach occurred "earlier this year" and was reported to the Ombudsman on Wednesday.

Under the revised data retention regime, police are required to obtain a warrant from a judge to seek metadata from a journalist.

"The vulnerability is the investigator needs to understand that that's their requirement," Mr Colvin said on Friday. "On this occasion, the investigator didn't."

The phone records in question were relevant to the investigation, Mr Colvin said, but "what was improper was that the right steps weren't taken to gain access to it".

The breach is the first such incident that has come to light under the government's new metadata retention regime, which requires service providers to store their customers' data for two years.

Acknowledging the policy was "controversial", Mr Colvin said Australians should nonetheless have "full confidence" in both the police and the policy.

He conceded the AFP's internal procedures had not anticipated and prevented the error and therefore those practices would be subject to "significant changes".

Access to metadata would now be restricted to more senior officers, he said, and the number of officers who can approve access to metadata will be reduced. Training will also be bolstered.

Asked if the unlawfully-obtained phone records would still be relied on to inform the actions of investigators, he acknowledged that once seen it could not be unseen.

"Clearly they can't unsee it. They'll need to consider ... what weight they put on what they saw," Mr Colvin said. "But that material was accessed illegally, so it can have no bearing on the conduct of the investigation."

He stressed the content of the journalist's phone calls were not accessed, just the call records. But Paul Murphy, chief executive of the Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance, said that was not a mitigating factor.

"It's another demonstration that the AFP do not understand the sensitivities here, the vital importance of protecting journalists' confidential sources," he said. "It's an absolute disgrace."

South Australian senator Nick Xenophon, who lobbied for extra safeguards for journalists when the laws were formulated, said he was "furious" about the revelation and would seek further amendments to the law.

"This is outrageous. There's been a flagrant breach of the law here," he said. "The safeguards have been completely trashed. This should chill the spine of every journalist in this country."

Australian government switches on mass surveillance machine against its people

The people in government have apparently passed some sort of legislation that allows them to monitor every mode of communication the mass population has including their location at every point in time an instance of communication has been made.

The government will also keep this information for ever and use it at any point in time (even when you're 90 years old) against you, and maybe at some later point in time bring up your forefather's (alleged) 'criminal' actions (internet browsing history) in your court matter.

When was this done?

When the peasants were flocking to celebrate the death of a man called Jesus Christ otherwise known as Easter.

Now why would the Australian Government turn on a mass surveillance machine against its own people, unless it sees the people as an enemy of the state?

Let's take a closer look at what is this 'Australian Government' and what is this 'the people'.

The people should be aware that in Australia, the founding legal document for 'authorities' to follow is a document called 'The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act' from the year 1901, or commonly referred to as 'The Constitution' for short.

Every single law that has been passed must be in line with this document called 'The Constitution'.

Every single court in this country must be a Chapter III (of the Constitution) court.

Putting aside any legal arguments into the validity of the 'Constitution', the highest court in this land is a business called the High Court of Australia, which has been only recently setup  (NOT in 1902) by an Act called the High Court of Australia Act 1979, by people from somewhere called the 'Australian Government', a place not as described in the 'Constitution'

According to the Constitution ALL laws must be made by the Parliament of the Commonwealth.

Currently ALL laws are made by the Parliament of Australia.

EVERY politician MUST recite the oath contained within the 'Constitution'.

Only recently it has been exposed that the people sitting in the High Court of Australia have committed criminal offences by removing the U.K. monarch from legal proceedings.

The High Court of Australia has been deceiving the people of Australia since 1973, and therefore as a result is not a court of competent jurisdiction.

There is plenty more to write about in detail into the corruption of Australia's executive with regards to their powers and the judiciary but this is beyond the scope of this post.

Let's now move across to who 'the people' are.

Since Australia is (still) a monarchy where the people are technically 'subjects' of Her Majesty, unless of course one has emigrated to Australia and signed  'Citizenship' paperwork (therefore succumbing to a republic), which brings them into a different jurisdiction. 

So for the best part of it, the Australian people who live in a monarchy are 'subjects' of Her Majesty.

So where do these people stand with regards to law / the law making process something technically called the Rule of Law?

1). The U.K. Monarch - Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II

2). The people of the state, 'subjects' of Her Majesty

3). Parliament - 'The Parliament of the Commonwealth' - The 'lawful' governing body the 'de jure' government.

The people in the corporation conglomerate called the 'Australian Government' are not in office lawfully, governing over the Australian people, the people of the state, 'subjects' of Her Majesty through fear, extortion, intimidation, threats of violence or incarceration for not heeding to corporate agreements.

The people are literally the enemy of this machine called the 'Australian Government'.

See what  Sydney Criminal Lawyers wrote on this topic (text only version):

As we all were preparing for the Easter break, the government switched on the full version of its metadata retention system.

Although the legislation enabling the scheme was passed in October 2015 – and data has been stored and accessed since then – last week marked the end of the ‘implementation period’.

This means everyone’s online activities are now being stored by Internet Service Providers – and must be released to a whole host of government agencies upon request, without those agencies having to obtain a warrant.

Journalist Quentin Dempster described the laws as turning “this country’s entire communications industry… into a surveillance and monitoring arm of at least 21 agencies of executive government.”

Why these laws are concerning

While the content of your communications is not meant to be looked at, the legally accessible data can still paint a detailed picture of your online activities – potentially enabling government agents to use selected data to bolster allegations against intended targets, or to track, hunt down and prosecute whistle blowers.

Indeed, government agencies including the Australian Federal Police have already admitted investigating many journalists and even doctors who have been critical of government policies and actions, by accessing their metadata.

The new legislation will make it a lot easier for these agencies to hunt down whistleblowers who expose government misconduct.

Data that can be legally accessed without a warrant includes:

• Telephone records
• The time and length of phone calls
• The internet protocol addresses (IP addresses) of computers from which messages are received or sent
• Location of parties making phone calls
• To and from email addresses on emails
• Logs of visitors to chat rooms online
• Status of chat sites – whether they are active and how many people are participating
• Chat aliases or identifiers (the name a person uses in a chat room online)
• Start and finish times of internet sessions
• The location of an individual involved in communications
• The name of the application someone uses online and when, where and for how long used

Attorney-General George Brandis claimed the purpose of the new scheme was to counter the threat of terrorism and smash organised crime gangs, and would not be misused.

However, the new laws have indeed been used to target people for a range of purposes which were not previously disclosed.

Use of metadata to date

Last year, it was revealed that over 60 Government agencies had applied to the Attorney-General for metadata access. The list includes the Australian Taxation Office, Department of Human Services, and even local councils.

In fact, Bankstown Council applied for metadata access in order to catch illegal rubbish dumpers and those who breach by-laws. That access was granted. And the Queensland Police Service used the scheme to access the metadata of cadets in an attempt to determine whether they were sleeping with one another, or faking sick days.

To many, dumping rubbish, monitoring the sexual activities of cadets or even evading tax is not enough to justify sacrificing the privacy of the entire Australian population – especially when the reason put forth for the implementation of the laws was to fight against terrorism and organised crime.

Protecting your privacy

There are many perfectly legal ways to circumvent the government’s metadata scheme. Here are just a few of them.

Hide your browsing data using a Virtual Private Network (VPN) service:

VPN’s work by creating a secure connection between your computer and another network. While you can still browse the internet freely, VPNs allow you to do this through the other network – disguising your tracks.

The only metadata that will be recorded is your connection to the other network. Electronic Frontiers Australia and Digital Rights Watch both have good introductions to choosing a VPN.

Protecting your emails by using online services:

If you use an email address supplied by your ISP (ie. @optus, @bigpond etc) they will be forced to record the address you emailed, attachment names, file sizes and location from which you send.

However, if you use an overseas browser-based email services, like Gmail or Hotmail, all your ISP can record is that your location, and how long you were connected to that service – and if you’re using a VPN they won’t even be able to see that.

Using Facebook Messenger to protect your SMS:

If you send a SMS from your phone, your ISP will record the number you SMSd, the time of the sms, its size and your location. However, this can be easily protected by using an App, such as Facebook Messenger or iMessage, that comes preloaded onto your phone.

Much like using a browser based email service, this will mean that they can only record the time you accessed the service, size of data exchanged, and your location – again, even this will be protected if your using a VPN.

Usings Skype to protect your phone calls:

If you make a call from your mobile phone, your ISP will record the number you called, the time of call, its duration, and your location.

However if you call using a smartphone app, such as Skype, Signal or Facebook Messenger, then they will only be able to record the time of your connection, and the amount of data used, and your location – again, you can protect against this by using a VPN.