24 March 2022

Fines Victoria alleged debt, under what lawfully enacted instrument?


This is an actual [template] letter from Fines Victoria from (an alleged) Mr. Duncan Stewart to a 'person', where the 'victim's' details have been obscured.

If you received this letter in your person's name then you may become a victim of fraud by more than one entity, against your person's name.

Let's begin!

Debtor:

  • How did you lawfully incur a debt to 'Fines Victoria' (ABN 68 122 448 122?)?

  • Was there a lawfully issued court order in your person's name and by whom?

  • Was the person issuing the order sitting in office lawfully?

  • Can that person produce the oath taken?

  • Did you get an opportunity to face your accuser?

  • What lawfully issued instrument was used to create the (alleged) debt?


'Dealing' with a fine:

Even at this late stage of the 'game' if you write a letter to Fines Victoria, or Mr. Duncan Stewart more specifically, that you require the matter to be revocated to the court, then you are 'dealing' with the fine.


I may:

The letter states: “I may take one or more actions to recover the amount you owe.”

This means that Mr. Stewart 'may', as opposed to will take action.

I may:-

  1. deduct money from your bank account or wages,

  2. direct VicRoads to suspend your driver licence or vehicle registration,

  3. or charge and sell the land you own.


Now, this is one of the more problematic sections of the letter.

First of all Mr. Stewart needs a lawfully issued instrument to carry out any of those actions, where if one does not exist he has carried out actions beyond his power, where the 'common law' crime of theft will occur if one or more of those actions are carried out.

In point iii). Mr. Stewart states that he 'may' charge and sell the land (eg. where your home is located on) you 'own'.

Mr. Stewart is stating that you factually 'own' this land?

Where is this paperwork that states that you 'own' the land he is coming for?

Mr. Stewart also states the following:

“ If a warrant is issued against you, the Sheriff may wheel clamp your vehicle, take and sell your assets, or arrest you."

Now, this is the most problematic part of the letter thus far.

A sheriff of a state is an officer of the state's Supreme Court.

In the case of Victoria, at this point in time, there is no lawfully appointed sheriff, nor was the previous (alleged) sheriff Mr. Brendan Facey lawfully appointed.

Again, what lawfully issued instrument will allow a person to take your possessions, arrest you or stop your vehicle from moving?


“take action”

Writing a letter to Me. Duncan Stewart regarding clarification with regards as to how one has lawfully become a 'debtor' to Fines Victoria is taking action in dealing with the matter.

There are many other aspects of law that must be considered with regards to obtaining a remedy to the letter presented to you.


For example, but not limited to:


  • If there is no lawfully appointed sheriff, then there are no lawful deputies.

  • If a warrant is factually issued it MUST be present to you in its prescribed format, where all the 'checks and balances' are present and not appear as an 'Excel' spreadsheet summary.

  • If you did not appear in court to face your accuser, then this is a breach of the Charter of Rights & Responsibilities, a denial of natural justice.

You must take further action as they will not give you a 'remedy' on a silver plate where they will try to deceive you in the process.

So far there have been no lawfully issued warrants in the state of Victoria, since at least the tenure of Mr. Brendan Facey, as director of Fines Victoria (and not the sheriff) arising from the 'Infringements Court'.

Remembering that judges/magistrates are tort feasors, and not as described under Ch.III of the Constitution.


See other articles:

https://corpau.blogspot.com/2017/05/sheriffs-warrants-do-not-exist-verified.html

https://corpau.blogspot.com/2016/01/what-warrant-form-looks-like.html

The media is paid to distract you

See explanation


Source: The West Report

21 March 2022

Password lengths & how long it takes to crack


A report from cybersecurity firm Hive Systems (via CNBC) reveals how long it can take the average hacker to figure out the passwords that you use to protect your most important online accounts. For example, using numbers alone could allow a hacker to instantly discover your password anywhere from 4 to 11 characters long.

If you use only lowercase letters for a password, you might as well just give the data you're protecting directly to the hackers. Passwords with four to eight characters that are lower case only can be cracked instantly according to Hive while a password consisting of nine lower case letters can be discovered in 10 seconds. If the password requires 10 characters, that time expands to 4 minutes while an 11 character password using nothing but lower case letters can be figured out in two hours.

Advancements in technology help hackers crack passwords faster than just two years ago


Using a mix of lower and uppercase letters, passwords of four through six characters can be cracked instantly according to the study. Passwords comprised of seven characters take only two seconds to discover while passwords with eight, nine, and 10 characters using both lower and upper case letters can be figured out in two minutes, one hour, and three days, respectively. An 11 character password using upper and lower case letters can hold off a hacker for up to five months.


Even if you were to mix in lower case and upper case letters along with numbers, using a password comprised of only four to six characters is not safe at all. And if you were to add symbols to the mix, even a six-letter password could be cracked instantly. The bottom line is that your password needs to be lengthy and adding one extra letter can make a huge difference in keeping your personal data safe.

For example, using lower and upper case letters, numbers, and symbols, a ten-letter password could be solved in five months according to the report. Using the same letters, numbers, and symbols, an 11-character password would take as long as 34 years to crack.

Your online passwords should be no less than eight characters long


Hive suggests that at the minimum, a password used online should contain no fewer than 8 characters using a mix of mix of numbers, uppercase letters, lowercase letters and symbols. Want to have your mind blown? An 18 character password using the aforementioned mix of numbers, letters, and symbols would take up to 438 trillion years to be discovered by the average hacker.

The cybersecurity firm posted a couple of colorful graphs showing how hackers are able to figure out passwords faster now than just two years ago because of advances in technology.

Source: phonearena.com


20 March 2022

Batteries do not make electricity


Batteries, they do not make electricity – they store electricity produced elsewhere, primarily by coal, uranium, natural gas-powered plants, or diesel-fueled generators. So, to say an EV is a zero-emission vehicle is not at all valid.

Also, since forty percent of the electricity generated in the U.S. is from coal-fired plants, it follows that forty percent of the EVs on the road are coal-powered, do you see?"

Einstein's formula, E=MC2, tells us it takes the same amount of energy to move a five-thousand-pound gasoline-driven automobile a mile as it does an electric one. The only question again is what produces the power? To reiterate, it does not come from the battery; the battery is only the storage device, like a gas tank in a car.

There are two orders of batteries, rechargeable, and single-use. The most common single-use batteries are A, AA, AAA, C, D. 9V, and lantern types. Those dry-cell species use zinc, manganese, lithium, silver oxide, or zinc and carbon to store electricity chemically. Please note they all contain toxic, heavy metals.

Rechargeable batteries only differ in their internal materials, usually lithium-ion, nickel-metal oxide, and nickel-cadmium. The United States uses three billion of these two battery types a year, and most are not recycled; they end up in landfills. California is the only state which requires all batteries be recycled. If you throw your small, used batteries in the trash, here is what happens to them.

All batteries are self-discharging. That means even when not in use, they leak tiny amounts of energy. You have likely ruined a flashlight or two from an old, ruptured battery. When a battery runs down and can no longer power a toy or light, you think of it as dead; well, it is not. It continues to leak small amounts of electricity. As the chemicals inside it run out, pressure builds inside the battery's metal casing, and eventually, it cracks. The metals left inside then ooze out. The ooze in your ruined flashlight is toxic, and so is the ooze that will inevitably leak from every battery in a landfill. All batteries eventually rupture; it just takes rechargeable batteries longer to end up in the landfill.

In addition to dry cell batteries, there are also wet cell ones used in automobiles, boats, and motorcycles. The good thing about those is, ninety percent of them are recycled. Unfortunately, we do not yet know how to recycle single-use ones properly.

But that is not half of it. For those of you excited about electric cars and a green revolution, I want you to take a closer look at batteries and also windmills and solar panels. These three technologies share what we call environmentally destructive production costs.

A typical EV battery weighs one thousand pounds, about the size of a travel trunk. It contains twenty-five pounds of lithium, sixty pounds of nickel, 44 pounds of manganese, 30 pounds cobalt, 200 pounds of copper, and 400 pounds of aluminum, steel, and plastic. Inside are over 6,000 individual lithium-ion cells.

It should concern you that all those toxic components come from mining. For instance, to manufacture each EV auto battery, you must process 25,000 pounds of brine for the lithium, 30,000 pounds of ore for the cobalt, 5,000 pounds of ore for the nickel, and 25,000 pounds of ore for copper. All told, you dig up 500,000 pounds of the earth's crust for just - one – battery."

Sixty-eight percent of the world's cobalt, a significant part of a battery, comes from the Congo. Their mines have no pollution controls, and they employ children who die from handling this toxic material. Should we factor in these diseased kids as part of the cost of driving an electric car?"

I'd like to leave you with these thoughts. California is building the largest battery in the world near San Francisco, and they intend to power it from solar panels and windmills. They claim this is the ultimate in being 'green,' but it is not. This construction project is creating an environmental disaster. Let me tell you why.

The main problem with solar arrays is the chemicals needed to process silicate into the silicon used in the panels. To make pure enough silicon requires processing it with hydrochloric acid, sulfuric acid, nitric acid, hydrogen fluoride, trichloroethane, and acetone. In addition, they also need gallium, arsenide, copper-indium-gallium- diselenide, and cadmium-telluride, which also are highly toxic. Silicon dust is a hazard to the workers, and the panels cannot be recycled.

Windmills are the ultimate in embedded costs and environmental destruction. Each weighs 1688 tons (the equivalent of 23 houses) and contains 1300 tons of concrete, 295 tons of steel, 48 tons of iron, 24 tons of fiberglass, and the hard to extract rare earths neodymium, praseodymium, and dysprosium. Each blade weighs 81,000 pounds and will last 15 to 20 years, at which time it must be replaced. We cannot recycle used blades.

There may be a place for these technologies, but you must look beyond the myth of zero emissions.

"Going Green" may sound like the Utopian ideal but when you look at the hidden and embedded costs realistically with an open mind, you can see that Going Green is more destructive to the Earth's environment than meets the eye, for sure.

The solution? Lead simpler lives and use less energy.

Source:supplied

18 March 2022

Air pollution causes ‘huge’ reduction in intelligence, study reveals

Impact of high levels of toxic air ‘is equivalent to having lost a year of education’

Air pollution in China is three times above World Health Organisation limits. Photograph: Kevin Frayer/Getty Images

Air pollution causes a “huge” reduction in intelligence, according to new research, indicating that the damage to society of toxic air is far deeper than the well-known impacts on physical health.

The research was conducted in China but is relevant across the world, with 95% of the global population breathing unsafe air. It found that high pollution levels led to significant drops in test scores in language and arithmetic, with the average impact equivalent to having lost a year of the person’s education.

“Polluted air can cause everyone to reduce their level of education by one year, which is huge,” said Xi Chen at Yale School of Public Health in the US, a member of the research team. “But we know the effect is worse for the elderly, especially those over 64, and for men, and for those with low education. If we calculate [the loss] for those, it may be a few years of education.”

Previous research has found that air pollution harms cognitive performance in students, but this is the first to examine people of all ages and the difference between men and women.

The damage in intelligence was worst for those over 64 years old, with serious consequences, said Chen: “We usually make the most critical financial decisions in old age.” Rebecca Daniels, from the UK public health charity Medact, said: “This report’s findings are extremely worrying.”

Air pollution causes seven million premature deaths a year but the harm to people’s mental abilities is less well known. A recent study found toxic air was linked to “extremely high mortality” in people with mental disorders and earlier work linked it to increased mental illness in children, while another analysis found those living near busy roads had an increased risk of dementia.

The new work, published in the journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, analysed language and arithmetic tests conducted as part of the China Family Panel Studies on 20,000 people across the nation between 2010 and 2014. The scientists compared the test results with records of nitrogen dioxide and sulphur dioxide pollution.

They found the longer people were exposed to dirty air, the bigger the damage to intelligence, with language ability more harmed than mathematical ability and men more harmed than women. The researchers said this may result from differences in how male and female brains work.

Derrick Ho, at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, said the impact of air pollution on cognition was important and his group had similar preliminary findings in their work. “It is because high air pollution can potentially be associated with oxidative stress, neuroinflammation, and neurodegeneration of humans,” he said.

Chen said air pollution was most likely to be the cause of the loss of intelligence, rather than simply being a correlation. The study followed the same individuals as air pollution varied from one year to the next, meaning that many other possible causal factors such as genetic differences are automatically accounted for.

The scientists also accounted for the gradual decline in cognition seen as people age and ruled out people being more impatient or uncooperative during tests when pollution was high.

Air pollution was seen to have a short-term impact on intelligence as well and Chen said this could have important consequences, for example for students who have to take crucial entrance exams on polluted days.

“But there is no shortcut to solve this issue,” he said. “Governments really need to take concrete measures to reduce air pollution. That may benefit human capital, which is one of the most important driving forces of economic growth.” In China, air pollution is declining but remains three times above World Health Organisation (WHO) limits.

According to the WHO, 20 of the world’s most polluted cities are in developing countries. China, home to several of those cities, has been engaged in a “war against pollution” for the past five years.

A migrant worker listens to the radio on his tricycle cart. Photograph: Andy Wong/AP

The results would apply around the world, Chen added. The damage to intelligence was likely to be incremental, he said, with a 1mg rise in pollution over three years equivalent to losing more than a month of education. Small pollution particles are known to be especially damaging. “That is the same wherever you live. As human beings we have more in common than is different.”

Aarash Saleh, a registrar in respiratory medicine in the UK and part of the Doctors Against Diesel campaign, said: “This study adds to the concerning bank of evidence showing that exposure to air pollution can worsen our cognitive function. Road traffic is the biggest contributor to air pollution in residential areas and the government needs to act urgently to remove heavily-polluting vehicles from our roads.”

Daniels said: “The UK’s air is illegally polluted and is harming people’s health every day. Current policies are not up to the scale of the challenge: government must commit to bringing air pollution below legal limits as soon as possible.”

Source: theguardian.com



16 March 2022

Ukraine on Fire Google's censorship


Once people get a hold of something that does not fit the 'corporate' agenda, and draw attention to it, the technocrats swing into action censoring it.

The latest being a documentary film by Oliver Stone from 2016 called Ukraine on Fire.

Google have already taken it down from YouTube a few times.

Google even knows that people have put it up elsewhere.

'Normally' when one types in a website name followed by the searched variable, Google points to it, but in this case, no mention of that website anywhere.

In any event, here is the link to the 2.1GB download that is active at the time of this post:

https://www.transfernow.net/en/dltransfer?utm_source=20220315mFEMnmSb

14 March 2022

No Jab No Social Security?

Social Security is a polarising topic for many Australians at the best of times, where these days it can be more contentious.

Once it was called the Department of Social Security, then Centrelink and now Services Australia.

What's in an name change, right?

Well, a lot more than what people are led to believe, but that's another topic altogether.

We've obtained information from within, with regards as to what the #ScottyFromMarketing administration is planning to enact in approximately 5 months from now, that being August 2022.

Many people should be aware that in pop culture, the (United States) constitution is mentioned or rather emphasised as lot, when it comes to the actions of authorities against the citizen population.

In Australia, the story could not be more different, where even if one actually refers to the legal founding document of the colony Australia, then one gets ridiculed by e.g. police, or even other administration staff.

People should be aware now of the 'tricks', enticements, blackmail and most importantly unlawful 'requests' used on persons in order for them to succumb to a medical service.

There's No Jab No Play, No Jab No Job, No Jab No Pay catch phrases that people are being forced into.

What the federal government is planning to employ in August is that a person will not receive social welfare payments unless that person has succumbed to a particular medical service.

There are a fair few problems with that.

One is that Section 51 (xxiiA) of that 'law' called the Constitution, forbids the Australian Government from providing medical and dental services in such a way as to oblige persons to accept those services.

The so called medical service that one must accept cannot be called what it is, as it does not provide the functions of what it's referred to as.

Proof does not exist that the follow up medical services that have been cleverly labelled as 'up to date' are factually effective.

Social modelling shows that when the safety net of welfare is taken away from the general population, criminal activity increases.

Therefore if/when this is enacted the people in government want more criminal activity to occur.

The authorities e.g. the police within the continent, in Western Australia and across the Tasman, in New Zealand are challenging the so called mandates and are having them nullified, whereas the general population must succumb to that unlawful request.

The general population do not comprehend the reality they live in on this continent.

While people are told that they live in a 'democracy' here, they certainly do not live in a 'free' society, as alleged elsewhere.

The actions are what's important, as opposed to what is being 'advertised' to you.

Australia, still being a colony enforces 'penal colony policies' where now during the events of the past two years have put the government into a totalitarian régime.

The very thing that the police have fought for, the general population is being beaten and assaulted for.


Grandmother being assaulted by Victoria Police during a peaceful Melbourne march.

Make no mistake Australia is a police state.


13 March 2022

Can The FBI Hack Into Private Signal Messages On A Locked iPhone? Evidence Indicates Yes


The FBI appears to have a tool that can access Signal messages, even if a device is locked. (Photo Illustration by Rafael Henrique/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images) SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images 

Signal has become the de facto king of secure messaging apps of late, stealing users from WhatsApp and gathering millions of others looking for private forms of communication. That means the police and governments will be wanting, more than ever, to ensure they have forensic techniques to access Signal messages. Court documents obtained by Forbes not only attest to that desire, but indicate the FBI has a way of accessing Signal texts even if they’re behind the lockscreen of an iPhone.

The clues came via Seamus Hughes at the Program on Extremism at the George Washington University in court documents containing screenshots of Signal messages between men accused, in 2020, of running a gun trafficking operation in New York. (The suspects have not yet entered a plea and remain innocent until proven guilty). In the Signal chats obtained from one of their phones, they discuss not just weapons trades but attempted murder too, according to documents filed by the Justice Department. There’s also some metadata in the screenshots, which indicates not only that Signal had been decrypted on the phone, but that the extraction was done in “partial AFU.” That latter acronym stands for “after first unlock” and describes an iPhone in a certain state: an iPhone that is locked but that has been unlocked once and not turned off. An iPhone in this state is more susceptible to having data inside extracted because encryption keys are stored in memory. Any hackers or hacking devices with the right iPhone vulnerabilities could then piece together keys and start unlocking private data inside the device.

Signal messages accessed in an investigation into a gun trafficking scheme, from a government filing in the case. Metadata between the messages indicates the phone was locked. Screenshot from Department of Justice file 

For police to access private Signal messages from an iPhone, there are some other caveats besides a device needing to be in AFU mode. The iPhone in question appears to be either an iPhone 11 (whether Pro or Max) or a second generation iPhone SE. It’s unclear if the police can access private data on an iPhone 12. It’s also not clear what software version was on the device. Newer iOS models may have better security. Apple declined to comment, but pointed Forbes to its response to previous research regarding searches of iPhones in AFU mode, in which it noted they required physical access and were costly to do.

A Signal spokesperson said: “If someone is in physical possession of a device and can exploit an unpatched Apple or Google operating system vulnerability in order to partially or fully bypass the lock screen on Android or iOS, they can then interact with the device as though they are its owner.

“Keeping devices up-to-date and choosing a strong lock screen passcode can help protect information if a device is lost or stolen.”

Counsel for the defendant in the New York case didn’t respond to messages. The Justice Department said it couldn’t comment.

GrayKey vs. Cellebrite

Forensic exploitation of devices affects any encrypted communications app, from WhatsApp to Wickr, not just Signal. What is apparent is that the government has a tool that can bypass encryption to get into what most people would assume are private messages. The question remains: What is that tool? It’s likely to be one of two popular iPhone forensics tools used by the FBI: the GrayKey or the Cellebrite UFED.

GrayKey, a tool created by Atlanta-based startup Grayshift, has been an increasingly popular choice for the FBI. The agency has spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on acquiring the devices, which start in price from $9,995. When Forbes obtained a leaked recording of Grayshift CEO David Miles talking in mid-2019, he said that his company’s tech could get “almost everything” on an iPhone in AFU mode.

Vladimir Katalov, founder of Russian forensics company ElcomSoft, said he believed GrayKey was the tool in use in the New York case. “It uses some very advanced approach using hardware vulnerabilities,” he hypothesized. Grayshift hadn’t responded to a request for comment at the time of publication.

Cellebrite, an established Israeli forensics tech provider, has long served American law enforcement, as well as global police agencies. A spokesperson said it was Cellebrite policy “not to comment on specific customers or uses of our technology,” but added that “law enforcement agencies are seeing a rapid rise in the adoption of highly encrypted apps like Signal by criminals who wish to communicate, send attachments and make illegal deals they want to keep discrete and out of sight from law enforcement.”

In December, Cellebrite indicated it had developed “advanced techniques” to bypass Signal encryption, though Signal issued a statement lambasting not just the company but media reports that had repeated Cellebrite’s claims. In a blog post, Signal said all Cellebrite had done was “parse Signal on an Android device they physically have with the screen unlocked.

“This is a situation where someone is holding an unlocked phone in their hands and could simply open the app to look at the messages in it. Their post was about doing the same thing programmatically (which is equally simple).”

When Signal cofounder Moxie Marlinspike commented on the Cellebrite claims in December, he called it “amateur hour.” Whatever tools the FBI used in the New York case, they’re far from amateur.

Source: forbes.com

 


10 March 2022

How Bluetooth compromises your privacy and security

Smartphone users worldwide have become victims of one of the greatest scams currently active, all in the name of so called health.

One of the purposes for the scam is for data collection on your person and not the alleged health situation, that gained headlines in 2020.


Here is how the Electronic Frontier Foundation described it within an article of the headline:

Apple and Google’s COVID-19 Exposure Notification API: Questions and Answers


Apple and Google are undertaking an unprecedented team effort to build a system for Androids and iPhones to interoperate in the name of technology-assisted COVID-19 contact tracing.

The companies’ plan is part of a torrent of proposals to use Bluetooth signal strength to enhance manual contact tracing with proximity-based mobile apps. As Apple and Google are an effective duopoly in the mobile operating system space, their plan carries special weight. Apple and Google’s tech would be largely decentralized, keeping most of the data on users’ phones and away from central databases. This kind of app has some unavoidable privacy tradeoffs, as we’ll discuss below, and Apple and Google could do more to prevent privacy leaks. Still, their model is engineered to reduce the privacy risks of Bluetooth proximity tracking, and it’s preferable to other strategies that depend on a central server.

Proximity tracking apps might be, at most, a small part of a larger public health response to COVID-19. This use of Bluetooth technology is unproven and untested, and it’s designed for use in smartphone apps that won’t reach everyone. The apps built on top of Apple and Google’s new system will not be a “magic bullet” technosolution to the current state of shelter-in-place. Their effectiveness will rely on numerous tradeoffs and sufficient trust for widespread public adoption. Insufficient privacy protections will reduce that trust and thus undermine the apps’ efficacy.

How Will It Work?

As soon as today, Apple and Google are beginning to roll out parts of the iPhone and Android infrastructure that developers need to be able to build Bluetooth-based proximity tracking apps. If you download one of these apps, it will use your phone’s Bluetooth chip to do what Bluetooth does: emit little radio pings to find other devices. Usually, these pings are looking for your external speakers or wireless mouse. In the case of COVID-19 proximity tracking apps, they will be reaching out to nearby people who have also opted into using Bluetooth for this purpose. Their phones will also be emitting and listening for those pings. The apps will use Bluetooth signal strength to estimate the distance between the two phones. If they are sufficiently close—6 feet or closer, based on current CDC guidance—both will log a contact event.

There are now many different proposals to do basically this same thing, with slightly different considerations for efficiency, security, and privacy. The rest of this post looks at Apple and Google’s proposal (version 1.1) in particular.

Each phone will generate a new special-purpose private key each day, known as a “temporary exposure key.” It will then use that key to generate random identification numbers called “rolling proximity identifiers” (RPIDs). Pings will go out at least once every five minutes when Bluetooth is enabled. Each ping will contain the phone’s current RPID, which will change every 10 to 20 minutes. This is meant to reduce the risk that third-party trackers can use the pings to passively track people’s locations. The operating system will save all of its temporary exposure keys, and log all the RPIDs it comes into contact with, for the past 2 weeks.

Proximity tracking apps might be, at most, a small part of a larger public health response to COVID-19.

If an app user learns they are infected, they can grant a public health authority permission to publicly share their temporary exposure keys. In order to prevent people from flooding the system with false alarms, health authorities need to verify that the user is actually infected before they may upload their keys. After they are uploaded, a user’s temporary exposure keys are known as “diagnosis keys.” The diagnosis keys are stored in a public registry and available to everyone else who uses the app. 

The diagnosis keys contain all the information needed to re-generate the full set of RPIDs associated with each infected user’s device. Participating apps can use the registry to compare the RPIDs a user has been in contact with against the RPIDs of confirmed COVID-19 carriers. If the app finds a match, the user gets a notification of their risk of infection.

The program will roll out in two phases. In phase 1, Google and Apple are building a new API into their respective platforms. This API will contain the bare-bones functionality necessary to make their proximity-tracing scheme work on both iPhones and Androids. Other developers will have to build apps that actually execute the new API. Draft specifications for the API have already been published, and it could be available for developers to use this week. In phase 2, the companies say that proximity tracking “will be introduced at the operating system level to help ensure broad adoption.” We know a lot less about this second phase.

Will It Work?

Several technical and social challenges stand in the way of automated proximity tracking. First, these apps assume that “cell phone = human.” But even in the U.S., cell phone adoption is far from universal. Elderly people and low-income households are less likely to own smartphones, which could leave out many people at the highest risk for COVID-19. Many older phones won’t have the technology necessary for Bluetooth proximity tracking. Phones can be turned off, left at home, run out of battery, or be set to airplane mode. So even a proximity tracking system with near-universal adoption is going to miss millions of contacts each day.

These apps assume that “cell phone = human," but cell phone adoption is far from universal.

Second, proximity tracking apps have to make the profound leap from “there is a strong Bluetooth signal near me” to “two humans are experiencing an epidemiologically relevant contact.” Bluetooth technology was not made for this. An app may log a connection when two people wearing masks briefly pass each other on a windy sidewalk, or when two cars with windows up sit next to each other in traffic. The proximity of a patient to a nurse in full PPE may look the same to Bluetooth as the proximity of two people kissing. Also, Bluetooth can be disrupted by large concentrations of water, like the human body. In some situations, although two people may be close enough to touch, their phones may not be able to establish radio contact. Accurately estimating the distance between two devices is even more difficult. 

Third, Apple and Google’s proposal currently specifies that phones will broadcast signals as seldom as once every five minutes. So even under otherwise optimal conditions, two phones may not log a contact until they’ve been near each other for the requisite amount of time.

Fourth, a significant portion of the population must actually use the apps. In Singapore, a government-developed app has only achieved about 20% adoption after several weeks. As a mobile platform duopoly, Apple and Google are in perhaps the best position possible to encourage the deployment of a new piece of software at scale. Even so, adoption may be slow, and it will never be universal.

Will It Be Private and Secure?

The truth is, nobody really knows how effective proximity tracking apps will be. Further, we need to weigh the potential benefits against the very real risks to privacy and security.

First, any proximity tracking system that checks a public database of diagnosis keys against RPIDs on a user’s device—as the Apple-Google proposal does—leaves open the possibility that the contacts of an infected person will figure out which of the people they encountered is infected. For example, if you have a contact with a friend, and your friend reports that they are infected, you could use your own device’s contact log to learn that they are sick. Taken to an extreme, bad actors could collect RPIDs en masse, connect them to identities using face recognition or other tech, and create a database of who’s infected. Other proposals, like the EU’s PEPP-PT and France and Germany’s ROBERT, purport to prevent this kind of attack, or at least make it more difficult, by performing matching on a central server; but this introduces more serious risks to privacy.

Second, Apple and Google’s choice to have infected users publicly share their once-per-day diagnosis keys—instead of just their every-few-minute RPIDs—exposes those people to linkage attacks. A well-resourced adversary could collect RPIDs from many different places at once by setting up static Bluetooth beacons in public places, or by convincing thousands of users to install an app. The tracker will receive a firehose of RPIDs at different times and places. With just the RPIDs, the tracker has no way of linking its observations together. 

A plain street map with several red dots indicating different Bluetooth pings.

If a bad actor were to set up a Bluetooth beacon or use an app to collect the location of people’s RPIDs, all they would get is a map like this: lots of different pings, but no indication of which pings belong to which individual.

But once a user uploads their daily diagnosis keys to the public registry, the tracker can use them to link together all of that person’s RPIDs from a single day. 

The same plain street map, this time with a line connecting some of the different red Bluetooth ping dots into one person's daily route.

If someone uploads their daily diagnosis keys to a central server, a bad actor could then use those keys to link together multiple RPID pings. This can expose their daily routine, such as where they live and work.

This can create a map of the user’s daily routine, including where they work, live, and spend time. Such maps are highly unique to each person, so they could be used to identify the person behind the uploaded diagnosis key. Furthermore, they can reveal a person’s home address, place of employment, and trips to sensitive locations like a church, an abortion clinic, a gay bar, or a substance abuse support group. The risk of location tracking is not unique to Bluetooth apps, and actors with the resources to pull off an attack like this likely have other ways of acquiring similar information from cell towers or third-party data brokers. But the risks associated with Bluetooth proximity tracking in particular should be reduced wherever possible.

This risk can be mitigated by shortening the time that a single diagnosis key is used to generate RPIDs, at the cost of increasing the download size of the exposure database. Similar projects, like MIT’s PACT, propose using hourly keys instead of daily keys. 

Third, police may seek data created by proximity apps. Each user’s phone will store a log of their physical proximity to the phones of other people, and thus of their intimate and expressive associations with some of those people, for several weeks. Anyone who has access to the proximity app data from two users’ phones will be able to see whether, and on what days, they have logged contacts with each other. This risk is likely inherent to any proximity tracking protocol. It should be mitigated by giving users the option to selectively turn off the app and delete proximity data from certain time periods. Like many other privacy threats, it should also be mitigated with strong encryption and passwords.

Apple and Google’s protocol may be susceptible to other kinds of attacks. For example, there’s currently no way to verify that the device sending an RPID is actually the one that generated it, so trolls could collect RPIDs from others and rebroadcast them as their own. Imagine a network of Bluetooth beacons set up on busy street corners that rebroadcast all the RPIDs they observe. Anyone who passes by a “bad” beacon would log the RPIDs of everyone else who was near any one of the beacons. This would lead to a lot of false positives, which might undermine public trust in proximity tracing apps—or worse, in the public health system as a whole.

What Should App Developers Do?

Apple and Google’s phase 1 is an API, which leaves it to the rest of the world to develop the actual apps that use the new API. Google and Apple have said they intend “public health authorities” to make apps. But most health authorities won’t have the in-house technical resources to do that, so it’s likely they will partner with private companies. Anyone who builds an app on top of the interface will have to do a lot of things right to make sure it’s private and secure. 

Bad-faith app developers may try to tear down the tech giants’ carefully constructed privacy guarantees. For example, although a user’s data is supposed to stay on their device, an app with access to the API might be able to upload everything to a remote server. It could then link daily private keys to a mobile ad ID or other identifier, and exploit users’ association history to profile them. It could also use the app as a “Trojan horse” to convince users to agree to a whole suite of more invasive tracking.

So, what’s a responsible app developer to do? For starters, they should respect the protocol they’re building on. Developers shouldn’t try to graft a more “centralized” protocol, which shares more data with a central authority, on top of Apple and Google’s more “decentralized” model that keeps users’ data on their devices. Also, developers shouldn’t share any data over the Internet beyond what is absolutely necessary: just uploading diagnosis keys when an infected user chooses to do so.

Developers should be extremely up-front with their users about what data the app is collecting and how to stop it. Users should be able to stop and start sharing RPIDs at any time. They also should be able to see the list of the RPIDs they’ve received, and delete some or all of that contact history.

The whole system depends on trust.

Equally important is what not to do. This is a public health crisis, not a chance to grow a startup. Developers should not force users to sign up for an account for anything. Also, they shouldn’t ship a contact tracing app with extra, unnecessary features. The app should do its job and get out of the way, not try to onboard users to a new service. 

Obviously, proximity tracing apps shouldn’t have anything to do with ads (and the exploitative, data-sucking mess that comes with them). Likewise, they shouldn’t use analytics libraries that share data with third parties. In general, developers should use strong, transparent technical and policy safeguards to wall this data off to COVID-19 purposes and only COVID-19 purposes.

The whole system depends on trust. If users don’t trust that an app is working in their best interests, they will not use it. So developers need to be as transparent as possible about how their apps work and what risks are involved. They should publish source code and documentation so that tech-savvy users and independent technologists can check their work. And they should invite security audits and penetration testing from professionals to be as confident as possible that their apps actually do what they say they will.

All of this will take time. There’s a lot that can go wrong, and too much is at stake to afford rushed, sloppy software. Public health authorities and developers should take a step back and make sure they get things right. And users should be wary of any apps that ship out in the days following Apple and Google’s first API release.

What Should Apple and Google Do?

Apple and Google should be transparent about exactly what their criteria are.

During the first phase, Apple and Google have said that the API can “only [be] used for contact tracing by public health authorities apps,” which “will receive approval based on a specific set of criteria designed to ensure they are only administered in conjunction with public health authorities, meet our privacy requirements, and protect user data.” Apple and Google should be transparent and specific about exactly what these criteria are. Through these criteria, the companies can control what other permissions apps have. For example, they could prevent COVID-19 proximity tracking apps from accessing mobile ad IDs or other device identifiers. They could also make more detailed policy prescriptions, like requiring that any app using the API have a clear mechanism for users to go back and delete parts of their contact log. Apple and Google’s app store approval criteria and related restrictions must also be evenly applied; if Apple and Google make exceptions for governments or companies that they are friendly with, they would undermine the trust necessary for informed consent.

In the second phase, the companies will build the proximity tracking technology directly into Android and iOS. This means that no app will be needed initially, though Apple and Google propose that the user be prompted to download an public health app if an exposure match is detected. All of the recommendations for app developers above also apply to Apple and Google here. Critically, the promised opt-in must obtain specific, informed consent from each user before activating any kind of proximity tracking. They need to make it easy for users who opt in to later opt out, and to view and delete the data that the device has collected. They should create strong technical barriers between the data collected for proximity tracking and everything else. And they should open-source their implementations so that independent security analysts can check their work.

This program must sunset when the COVID-19 crisis is over.

Finally, this program must sunset when the COVID-19 crisis is over. Proximity tracking apps should not be repurposed for other things, like tracking more mild seasonal flu outbreaks or finding witnesses to a crime. Google and Apple have said that they “can disable the exposure notification system on a regional basis when it is no longer needed.” This is an important ability, and Apple and Google should establish a clear, concrete plan for when to end this program and removing the APIs from their operating systems. They should publicly state how they will define “the end of the crisis,” including what criteria they will look for, and which public health authorities will guide them. 

There will be no quick tech solution to COVID-19. No app will let us return to business as usual. App-assisted contact tracing will have serious limitations, and we don’t yet know the scope of the benefits. If Apple and Google are going to spearhead this grand social experiment, they must do it in a way that keeps privacy risks to an absolute minimum. And if they want it to succeed, they must earn and keep the public’s trust.

Bluetooth contact tracing is a dangerous security hole

Governments and corporations have implemented a mass surveillance mechanism with total disregard for the privacy and security of those that are in their sights.

Smartphone users have been 'enticed' to use government issued contact tracing apps.

To make matters worse for the user's privacy and security, the smartphone operating system [deliberate] duopoly Apple and Google have forced their 'contact tracing' program upon the users with zero opt out, under the 'health' banner.

It's baked into the operating system and you cannot remove it, unless of course you are running Android AOSP.

Apart from that the contact tracing method is ineffective.

Even after the so called disease is gone, the tracking app is not, where the security hole will always exist on your device.

See post from 2020, where it's a:

"A comprehensive, technobabble free explanation of how Bluetooth contact tracing (doesn't) work and why simple solutions are often not that simple, if not outright dangerous, when applied in real life."

under the headline:

SARS-CoV-2 Bluetooth contact tracing apps are a tremendously stupid idea!

It’s an intriguingly simple concept: when someone tests positive for SARS-CoV-2, quarantine him, get a list of everyone he has been in contact with for the last week, quarantine them as well. Unfortunately, this method doesn’t scale well when done manually and most people won’t know, let alone remember, all the other people they met in the past seven days. However, since (virtually) everybody owns a mobile phone, why not make them simply exchange their owners calling cards automatically via Bluetooth, when coming “in contact” (=2 meters for 10 minutes) with each other?


Of course, simply handing out full contact details to everyone in the vicinity is not a smart idea. The inevitable result would be an inbox full of spam and hoax messages, helicopter parents would spy on their children, jealous spouses will want to know if their partners are cheating, government agencies and law enforcement … to be honest, I have no idea why they should be interested, but surely, they will.

So, “privacy” has to be a build-in feature of the app, but is it possible to be identifiable and anonymous at the same time? As self-contradicting as it sounds, it actually is!

Let there be app!

The basic idea behind the DP-3T protocol as well as Google and Apples joint effort works as follows (simplified summary):

Every smartphone gets a unique calling card number (not connected to anything), which is then broadcasted once per minute via Bluetooth. Whenever a smartphone receives such a broadcast 10 times in a row, with the signal strength indicating a distance of less then 2 meters, it assumes a contact and remembers the transmitted calling card number for the next 7 days.

If a user finds himself infected, he publishes his calling card number to a central bulletin board. All phones with the app installed check the board regularly for calling card numbers, they have seen within the last week. When a match is found, the phone assumes an infection. That is, publishes its own calling card number to the bulletin board and alerts its user to take actions (get tested/quarantined). This forms a simple alarm chain that only passes on an “infected” status, without allowing anyone to find out the identity of the other links.

Clever! But how would this mechanism work in the real world? Story time!

Day 1

Meet Joe Average, a reasonably responsible, reasonably intelligent, everyday person. There is nothing remarkable about him at all. If you were to conduct a scientific study, he’s the kind of guy, you’d want to include.

Today is when, the SARS-CoV-2 Bluetooth contact tracing app becomes available. Let’s see, how Joe spends the day…

08:00
Joe wakes up. A notification on his phone prompts him to install a new app. The description makes sense, so he complies without giving it further thought. In fact, not being too tech-savvy, he completely misunderstands the concept, thinking the app will warn him of infected people in the vicinity.
09:00
Joe's apartment is on the fifth floor. Out of convenience, he takes the elevator down. The idea that someone might have sneezed in the cabin earlier does not occur to him.
11:00
Joe enters a supermarket. He is in need of some toiletries, which he could easily carry in his hands. Nevertheless, the supermarket now has a policy that forces him to use a shopping cart. He wonders if the staff disinfected the handle properly, then decides to grab the cart by the side. Unfortunately, the previous user had the same idea, while the supermarket staff did not.
12:00
A homeless person gets uncomfortably close while asking Joe for some spare change. This is deliberate. The begging community learned quickly that the COVID-19 fear, if played correctly, will increase the success rate for getting a handout.
16:00
Luv u! Licksies?
Joe meets a friend in the park, who's walking "Smooch", his dog. Smooch is a friendly 75 lb Boxer mongrel, who just loves licking faces, but will also happily settle for hands, if faces are not available. Several small children and senior citizens (none of them carrying a smartphone) have petted him today so far. Joe gets the works.
19:00
Joe meets a girl, he'll only ever know as "Suzie" (not her real name) at a bar. She literally wears nothing except a red dress and high heels. There's really no question as to her intents and who's going to pay the tab.
19:30
Common sense and Hormones have a short, but passionate debate. Hormones win with a little help from alcohol.

Joe does catch SARS-CoV-2 Today. When? Where? How? Well, that is everyone’s guess! He certainly had a lot of opportunity.

Assessment The fundamental flaw of Bluetooth contact tracing is that phones, not people, most certainly not viri are tracked. Every moment in the timeline above breaks the alarm chain because a phone was not in the right place at the right time. Of course, having a broken alarm chain is still better than not having one at all, one might say, but not if it comes at the price of people, like Joe, getting careless.

Day 2

Meet Jane Doe, Joe’s next door neighbor. Joe and Jane’s daily routines are vastly different, so they almost never meet each other in the hall. They do have some similarities, though. Like, for example, using their phones as an alarm clock. Also, the bedrooms of their two apartments are separated by the same wall. Whatever they put on their nightstands is pretty much just an arms length apart.

(The rent is about as cheap as this sketch)

Jane got the same notification as Joe, but hesitated at first. She did not install the app until after midnight. Nevertheless, the two phones spent most of that night well within a 2m radius of each other and without any means of detecting the wall in between. Joe might as well have been sleeping with Jane instead of Suzie, as far as the apps are concerned (just one of the many reasons, why privacy by design is a must).

Jane is a biology teacher, teaching a graduation class. Most of her students own (much to her dismay) a smartphone and today is an important exam. Jane, knowing a thing or two about viri, takes reasonable precautions, like wearing a mask and keeping the windows open. However, she can’t prevent her tracer app from picking up a few dozen contacts that day. Of course, this is mutual. Whoever she logs as a contact, logs her as well. Later that day, her students will also log their families.

Assessment Bluetooth contact tracing is hyped as a silver bullet, an alternative to social distancing. It is neither! It merely replaces an effective countermeasure with an inferior one in order to permit risky behavior again. In other words, for policy makers, the availability of Bluetooth contact tracing is an excuse to raise the threshold for what is deemed “dangerous” without actually lowering the risk.

Day 3

It’s John Smith’s day off. He’s a long-distance trucker and parent of one of Jane Doe’s front row students. Their father-daughter day starts off with the two logging a contact for each other.

Assessment At first it may seem as if Jane Doe and John Smith are just two different names for the same function, but they aren’t. She’s a multiplier (spreads to many people locally), he is a bridge (spreads to few people, but across barriers).

Day 4

John starts a new tour. He picks up cargo early in the morning and drops it off in another town after sunset. Since it is too late already to drive back home, he stays at a motel for the night. He could have slept in his truck, but today he is having company. The kind of company that would make him uninstall the tracing app right away, if it didn’t guarantee privacy.

Assessment John is not infected, but part of an alarm chain. He just linked two multipliers in different communities together. Keep in mind that we are only tracking contacts as infections, not actual infections!

Day 5

Joe wakes up, feeling a bit under the weather. At first, he brushes it off, but his condition worsens fast. In the afternoon, he finally seeks medical attention which includes a SARS-CoV-2 smear test.

Assessment Any manual action that is required between suspicion, confirmation and reporting causes signalling delay. In this case, the virus gets another day to spread from anyone, Joe might have infected. This makes all the argument for automatic alarm forwarding, even if false alarms are to be expected.

Day 6

Joe’s test results are back: positive. He does the responsible thing and hits the “I am infected” button in his contact tracing app. Within minutes, the alarm cascades through his contacts and the contacts of his contacts. Everyone who has directly or indirectly gotten in touch (pun intended) with him for the last week receives a message with a simple choice:

Either stay at home for 14 days or pay for a test and stay at home till you have the results.

The social graph of Joe (red), Jane (yellow) and John(blue)

Potentially a few hundred people are going to have a really rotten day. Most of them will have no clue of where they might have caught the bug (after all, that was the whole point of making a contact tracing app, wasn’t it?) or if they actually caught it at all, but now they carry the “infected” status with all the social and legal implications.

Joe would be really unpopular by now if the app did not guarantee privacy.

Assessment An alarm, especially a false one, raises the question of liability. Is Joe responsible for having been careless? Is Jane responsible for causing a false alarm? Is the app maker responsible for the security holes in the protocols design? Fact is, a lot of people will have to drop everything in order to get tested and someone will have to foot the bill. False alarms are a pretty convincing reason to uninstall the app.

Meanwhile in an alternate reality

There are, of course, different versions of the story above. Let’s explore some alternatives by putting Joe (source), Jane (multiplier) and John Smith (bridge) in slightly different roles.

Joe, the hacker
What if Joe stayed home the first day (did not get infected), got hold of Jane’s phone and decides to swat her for fun?
Joe, the slacker
What if Joe was not a neighbor of Jane, but one of her students, desperate to meet a deadline. Could he buy himself an extension by faking an infection?
Joe, the movie buff
What if Joe had invited Suzie to the movies and turned his phone off before entering the cinema hall?
Joe, the deceived
Plot twist: Joe just caught the flu. Same symptons, different pathogen. Should he wait for test results (or be tested at all) before hitting the alarm?
Joe, the unprepared
Joe is single. What if he runs out of food while quarantined? Will he sneak out, leaving his phone at home?
Joe, the kindergarten teacher
What if someone had the idea to reopen kindergarten, thinking the availability of Bluetooth contact tracing renders social distancing unnecessary?
Jane, the hypochondriac
What if Jane had an unrelated symptom, quarantined herself without a test and thinks, she gained immunity afterwards.
Jane, the gym instructor
How many contacts would Jane’s phone log, if she left it in the locker room?
John, the secret agent
Are there countries that would benefit from keeping other countries in lockdown? If so, what could be more effective than interlinking as many people as possible, then sending a fake alarm?
101010, the software bug
Is it possible that a piece of software, especially one, that is based on a bad idea and coded in a hurry, might malfunction?

Every sufficiently large community will have multiple Joes, Janes and Johns. The story above inevitably unfolds, over and over, time-displaced, in parallel and with numerous variations. Some of the story lines will intertwine, others won’t. Every variations adds complexity and requires exception handling.

Privacy aware Bluetooth contact tracing is fragile at best. Even a tiny amount of malevolence or stupidity can easily send waves through the entire system, making it completely unreliable. We are essentially putting our faith in a system that is constantly going to cry wolf. (Repeated) false alarms have consequences:

  • People will stop taking alarms serious.
  • People will uninstall the app.
  • People will try to circumvent the app (Suzie, for example, simply left her smartphone at home).

Worst of all, however, people will demand the app to be fixed and governments will succumb to the sunk cost fallacy.

Privacy has to go!

The privacy aware approach has three major weakness:

  1. The system is open for trolling.
  2. Any incoming alarm must be treated as the real thing.
  3. A false alarm cannot (efficiently) be cancelled.

Obviously, an anonymous bulletin board will not work in real life, so the next version of the contact tracing app will have to be backed by a central authority that knows the identity of every user. Needless to say that this will, quite rightly, creep people out and result in the app getting uninstalled.

Installation is mandatory!

Voluntary use of the app builds on trust. Trust builds on privacy. Privacy cannot be guaranteed. This means, the only way to get the app on people’s phones is by installing it forcefully and making it unclosable (i.e. make it part of the operation system). People who don’t carry a smartphone, or turn it off will eventually find that they may no longer be permitted to enter supermarkets or use public transports.

Of course, the app will still not work properly, as people will make an effort to actively circumvent or even sabotage the system.

No end in sight!

Privacy, schmiracy. Many app proponents are of the opinion that saving human lives is more important than saving human rights. Of course, expressing that opinion requires the basic human right of free speech. So, yeah there’s an interesting discussion starter. Another interesting and more practical question is: for how long are we going to suspend the right to privacy?

The world is full of places with poor medical care. Slums, refugee camps and the like are communities where SARS-CoV-2 can go into hiding and from where it can be re-imported at any time. The pandemic does not really end till the virus is completely eradicated. There are just dormant phases in between outbreaks and those are the ones when we actually need the contact tracing apps to be active.

So, when can we have our privacy back? The answer is pretty much: never.

Conclusion

Bluetooth contact tracing is a dumb idea. At best, it will not work, at worst, it will lead is into a dystopian future.

Listening to scientists is generally a good idea. Some Epidemiologist/virologists may suggest contact tracing apps as a promising approach, but their expertise is in… well, epidemiology/virology, not computer science. Ask a computer scientist for their opinion and the answer is: FUCK NO!